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REFORMING THE SECOND TIER OF THE
U.S. PENSION SYSTEM: TABULA RASA OR
STEP BY STEP?
G. A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE & JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Employer-sponsored pensions, the second tier of the United
States retirement system, ought to be a major source of lifetime
income in retirement for many, if not most, Americans.1 However,
while employer-sponsored pensions are mandatory or quasimandatory in many countries,2 they are voluntary in the United

 Copyright © 2013, George A. Mackenzie & Jonathan Barry Forman.
Consulting economist and editor, Journal of Retirement; Dalhousie
University B.A. 1970; Oxford University M.A. 1972; MPhil 1974 (Rhodes
Scholar); IMF staff member, 1978-2007; Public Policy Institute, AARP 20082012.
Alfred P. Murrah Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A. 1973,
Northwestern University; M.A. (Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D.
1978, University of Michigan; M.A. (Economics) 1983, George Washington
University; Professor in Residence at the Internal Revenue Service Office of
Chief Counsel, Washington, D.C. for the 2009-2010 academic year; Member of
the Board of Trustees of the Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System,
2003-2011.
1. WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO PROTECT
THE OLD AND PROMOTE GROWTH xiv (Oxford University Press, 1994)
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/
IB/1994/09/01/000009265_3970311123336/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
(stating that the United States and most other industrialized nations have
multi-pillar retirement systems that can be described as falling within the
World Bank’s multi-pillar model for retirement savings consisting of a firsttier public system, a second-tier employment-based pension system, and a
third-tier of supplemental voluntary savings); see also Robert Holzmann &
Richard Hinz, Old-Age Income Support in the 21st Century: An International
Perspective on Pension Systems and Reform (World Bank, 2005), http://
www.egm.org.tr/kutuphane/Old_Age_Income_Support_Complete.pdf
(suggesting an additional pillar for informal intra-family or intergenerational
sources of both financial and nonfinancial support to the elderly, including
access to health care and housing); Lans Bovenberg & Casper Van Ewijk, The
Future of Multi-Pillar Pension Systems, (Network for Studies on Pensions,
Aging and Retirement, Discussion Paper No. 09/2011-079, 2011), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1935307.
2. OECD, PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN
OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES 84 (OECD Publishing, 2011) available at http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/pensions-at-a-glance2011_pension_glance-2011-en.
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States.3 That is, employers are not required to offer pensions, and
when they do, they have considerable leeway about whom to cover
and how much to contribute on their behalf. Not surprisingly, at
any given time, only about one out of two American workers has a
pension, and few can be confident that they will have enough
income to meet their economic needs throughout retirement.4
Moreover, 401(k)-type plans offered by employers have largely
displaced traditional defined benefit plans as the dominant type of
plan.5 Membership in a 401(k) plan, however, does not guarantee
that retirement savings will be adequate; in fact, many 401(k) plan
participants do not take full advantage of their plans in that they
neither contribute the maximum nor take full advantage of
employer matches. These days, the median balance of these plans
is only around $77,000,6 which is enough to finance a stream of
before-tax annual income of about $5,000 a year for life at current
interest rates.7 Yet, 401(k) plans are not required to offer
3. JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 214 (Urban
Institute Press, 2006); Kathryn L. Moore, An Overview of the U.S. Retirement
Income Security System and the Principles and Values It Reflects, 33
COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 5, 17 (2011).
4. See infra Part III.B. (explaining that few American workers can be
confident that they will have enough income to meet their economic needs
throughout retirement).
5. See infra Part II.B.4. (discussing how traditional defined benefit plans
have been displaced by 401(k) type plans).
6. See, e.g., Fidelity.com, Fidelity Average 401(k) Balance Climbs to
Record High at the End of 2012 (Feb. 14, 2013) available at http://
www.fidelity.com/inside-fidelity/employer-services/fidelity-analysis-findsrecord-high-average-401k-balance (finding that the average 401(k) balance
reached $77,300 at the end of the fourth quarter of 2012); see also SANDY
MACKENZIE & KE BIN WU, EMPLOYER-PROVIDED PENSIONS: LESS TO COUNT
ON 33 (AARP, 2009) available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/econ-sec/
2009-17-pensions.pdf
(finding that the median balance of the combined holdings of 401(k) plans and
IRAs for working families whose head was aged 60-64 years was $106,000 in
2007, when stock prices were near their peak); Craig Copeland, Individual
Account Retirement Plans: An Analysis of the 2010 Survey of Consumer
Finances, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., Sept. 2012, at 11 available at http://
www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09-2012_No375_IndvAccts.pdf
(finding
that among families with an IRA or Keogh plan in 2010, the median balance
was $40,000; and among families with a defined contribution plan, the median
balance was $29,000); see also Insured Retirement Institute, Overcoming
Barriers to Saving: How Boomers Can Get on the Path to Retirement Security,
1
(2012)
available
at
https://www.myirionline.org/eweb/uploads/
October%20Report%20Final.pdf (finding that 22% of Baby Boomers reported
having no savings for retirement); Chris E. Anguelov, Howard M. Iams &
Patrick J. Purcell, Shifting Income Sources of the Aged, SOC. SEC. BULL., 2012,
at 59, 63 available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v72n3/ssb-v72n3.pdf
(finding that the median value of assets held in retirement savings accounts
among households headed by people aged 65 in 2007 was $60,800).
7. Immediate Annuities Update, ANNUITY SHOPPER, Winter 2013, at 23,
28 available at http://www.annuityshopper.com/archives/2013-Jan-AnnuityShopper.pdf (showing that for a 65-year-old man who purchased a $100,000
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annuities and very few do. Indeed, there has been a significant
decline in annuitization of retirement savings by workers.8 The
shift to 401(k) plans is a large part of the story, but it remains true
that people rarely choose to buy annuities voluntarily, even
though annuities could provide them with very valuable insurance
against living too long.9
How much a household should save for retirement and how
much of that accumulated saving should be used to purchase an
annuity are extremely difficult to determine. Economists assume
that the basic goal of retirement saving is to generate a nest egg
large enough to sustain the standard of living in retirement that
the saver enjoyed while working. It is generally assumed that the
ratio of income in retirement to income in working life, known as
the replacement ratio, needed to achieve this goal is less than one
hundred percent. In fact, it is more like eighty percent, because
certain expenses like commuting, lunches, and other various
expenses would not be needed.10
Even if we can be very precise about the replacement ratio a
household should target, determining the share of income that
ought to be put aside to finance retirement is no mean feat, given
how uncertain the rate of return to saving and household income
can be.11 Further, even if we can predict incomes and rates of
return exactly, the mathematics involved in calculating the
targeted saving rate would be beyond the means of most people. In
any case, simply maintaining the needed saving regimen is itself a
challenge, given the number of temptations that the American
consumer faces. All in all, there is reason to believe that many, if
not most, American workers are not saving enough for retirement.
This article focuses on how to reform America’s employersponsored pension system. It begins with an overview of the
current retirement system, which includes both Social Security
and private pensions. Next, this article considers how much
retirement savings workers will need to ensure that they have
adequate incomes throughout retirement. Finally, the article offers
some recommendations about what a good, second-tier (employersponsored) pension system would look like.

immediate, level-payment annuity without inflation protection in 2012, the
average annual payout was $6,336 per year (12 × $528 per month) or 6.336%
of the annuity’s purchase price; and $4,897.73 = 6.336% × $77,300 average
401(k) balance).
8. See infra Part III.C (discussing the significant decline in annuitization
of retirement savings by workers).
9. Id.
10. See infra Part III.D (noting that at retirement, individuals will need to
replace around 80% of their pre-retirement income).
11. Michael Finke, Wade D. Pfau & David M. Blanchett, The 4% Rule is
Not Safe in a Low-Yield World (Jan. 15, 2013), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2201323.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES RETIREMENT SYSTEM
The United States retirement system consists of a universal
Social Security system, a voluntary, employment-based pension
system, and supplemental voluntary savings. These are discussed
in turn.
A. Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
The current Social Security system includes two programs
that provide monthly cash benefits to workers and their families.12
The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program provides
monthly cash benefits to retired workers and their dependents and
to survivors of insured workers; and the Disability Insurance (DI)
program provides monthly cash benefits for disabled workers
under full retirement age and their dependents. A worker builds
protection under these programs by working in employment
covered by Social Security and paying the applicable payroll taxes.
At retirement, disability, or death, monthly Social Security
benefits are paid to insured workers and to their eligible
dependents and survivors.
The OASI program is by far the larger of these two programs,
and it is usually what people mean when they talk about Social
Security. Consequently, for the remainder of this article, “Social
Security retirement taxes” will refer to OASI taxes, and “Social
Security retirement benefits” will refer to OASI benefits.
Historically, “full retirement age” was age 65, but it is currently
age 66, and it is gradually increasing to age 67 for workers born
after 1959 who will reach that age in or after 2027.13 In January
2013, OASI paid benefits to almost 37 million retired workers, and
the average monthly benefit paid to a retired worker was
$1,264.03.14
Social Security retirement benefits are financed primarily
through payroll taxes imposed on working individuals in
employment that is covered by the Social Security system. For
2013, employees and employers each pay a Social Security
12. FORMAN, supra note 3, at 184-90.
13. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, RETIREMENT PLANNER: FULL
RETIREMENT AGE, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/retirechart.htm (last
visited Apr. 19, 2013).
14. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, MONTHLY STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT,
JANUARY 2013 http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot (last
visited Apr. 19, 2013); for estimates of the expected present value of lifetime
benefits, see C. Eugene Steuerle & Caleb Quakenbush, Social Security and
Medicare Taxes and Benefits over a Lifetime: 2012 Update, URBAN INSTITUTE,
2012,
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412660-SocialSecurity-and-Medicare-Taxes-and-Benefits-Over-a-Lifetime.pdf (showing that
a single man earning the average-wage [$44,600 in 2012 dollars] who retired
in 2010 at age 65 would have lifetime Social Security benefits with a present
value of $277,000 [$302,000 for a single woman]).
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retirement tax of 5.3% on up to $113,700 of wages, for a combined
OASI rate of 10.6%—the lion’s share of the total 15.3% collected
for OASI, DI, and Medicare.15 Self-employed workers pay an
equivalent OASI tax of 10.6% on up to $113,700 of net earnings.16
Workers over the age of 62 generally are entitled to Social
Security retirement benefits if they have worked in covered
employment for at least 10 years.17 Benefits are based on a
measure of the worker’s earnings history in covered employment.
Of note, however, the benefit formula is highly progressive,18 and
as a result, the Social Security retirement system favors workers
with low lifetime earnings relative to workers with higher lifetime
earnings.19 For example, Figure 1 shows how a worker’s initial

15. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 2013 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES
(2012), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/
colafacts2013.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2013).
16. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 414(a)(2) (2006).
18. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFIT
AMOUNTS (Oct. 16, 2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/
Benefits.html. For example, benefits for retired workers are based on a
measure of the worker’s earnings history in covered employment known as the
“average indexed monthly earnings” (AIME)). The starting point for
determining the worker’s AIME is to determine how much the worker earned
each year through age 60. Id. Once those “benefit computation years” and
covered earnings for those years have been identified, the worker’s earnings
are indexed for wage inflation, using the year the worker turns 60 to index the
earnings of prior years. Id. The highest 35 years of earnings are then selected,
and the other years are dropped out. Id. The AIME is then computed as the
average earnings for the remaining 35 years (420 months). Id. The AIME is
then linked by a progressive formula to the monthly retirement benefit
payable to the worker at full retirement age, a benefit known as the “primary
insurance amount” (PIA). Id. For a worker turning 62 in 2013, the PIA equals
90% of the first $791 of the worker’s AIME, plus 32% of the AIME over $791
and through $4,768 (if any), plus 15% of the AIME over $4,768 (if any); SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PRIMARY INSURANCE AMOUNT (Oct.16, 2012)
available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/piaformula.html.
19. See, e.g., MICHAEL CLINGMAN, KYLE BURKHALTER & CHRIS CHAPLAIN,
MONEY’S WORTH RATIOS UNDER THE OASDI PROGRAM FOR HYPOTHETICAL
WORKERS (Mar. 2013) available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/ran7/
index.html. To be sure, the redistributive benefits of the progressive benefit
formula are tempered by the relatively longer life expectancies of high earners
relative to low earners; see, e.g., HILARY WALDRON, TRENDS IN MORTALITY
DIFFERENTIALS AND LIFE EXPECTANCY FOR MALE SOCIAL SECURITY–COVERED
WORKERS, BY AVERAGE RELATIVE EARNINGS (2007) available at http://
www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/workingpapers/wp108.html (presenting an analysis of
trends in mortality differentials and life expectancy by average relative
earnings for male Social Security–covered workers aged 60 or older). Also,
because high-earners are more likely to be married than low-earners, highearners receive a disproportionate share of the Social Security system’s rather
generous spousal benefits. In 2010 for example, 78.4% of households in the top
20% of household income were married-couple families, but only 17.0% of
households in the bottom 20% were married-couple families. Mark J. Perry,
Income inequality can be explained by household demographics (American
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retirement benefits compare to her final pre-retirement earnings.20
Of particular note, these redistributive Social Security retirement
benefits play an important role in reducing poverty among the
elderly. For example, without Social Security benefits, 43.6% of
elderly Americans would have fallen below the poverty level in
2011, but with Social Security benefits, just 8.7% of elderly
Americans were poor that year.21

Source: Virginia Reno & Elisa Walker, Social Security Benefits, Finances,
and Policy Options: A Primer, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE,
2012, at 6 available at http://www.nasi.org/research/2012/social-securitybenefits-finances-policy-options-primer.

Similarly, Figure 2 shows the initial Social Security
retirement benefits and replacement rates that workers born in
the 1970s are scheduled to receive when they reach age 65 in and
after 2035.22 All in all, Social Security replacement rates are high
Enterprise Institute, AEIdeas blog, 2011) available at http://www.aeiideas.org/2011/10/income-inequality-can-be-explained-by-householddemographics/#print.
20. Virginia Reno & Elisa Walker, Social Security Benefits, Finances, and
Policy Options: A Primer, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, 2012, at
6 available at http://www.nasi.org/research/2012/social-security-benefitsfinances-policy-options-primer.
21. Paul N. Van de Water & Arloc Sherman, Social Security Keeps 21
Million Americans Out of Poverty: A State-by-State Analysis (Oct. 16, 2012)
available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-16-12ss.pdf (also noting that Social
Security benefits lifted 14,480,000 elderly Americans out of poverty in 2011);
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Secretary,
Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 78 FEDERAL REGISTER 5,182-3,
(Jan. 24, 2013)(noting that in 2013, the poverty level for a single individual is
$11,490, and the poverty level for a married couple is $15,510.
22. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTAL DATA FOR CBO’S
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when incomes are low, but those rates may not be high enough to
keep recipients above the poverty line; and rates drop
substantially as incomes rise.

Source: CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTAL
DATA FOR CBO’S 2012 LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS FOR SOCIAL
SECURITY Exhibit 10 (2012) available at
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43653
Note: The average initial replacement rate is a worker’s initial
benefit as a percentage of a worker’s average annual lifetime earnings.

Benefits may be increased or decreased for several reasons.
Most importantly, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of retiree
benefits is kept constant by an annual adjustment of nominal
benefits to compensate for consumer price inflation.23 In addition,
the “retirement earnings test” can reduce the monthly benefits of
2012 LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY Exhibit 10 (2012)
available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43653; see Peter Brady, Kimberly
Burham & Sarah Holden, The Success of the U.S. Retirement System,
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2012, at 17-20 available at http://
www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12_success_retirement.pdf (stating that future retirees
are projected to receive somewhat higher Social Security retirement benefits
than today’s beneficiaries); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2012 LONGTERM PROJECTIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (2012)
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43648SocialSecurity.pdf; but see Alicia H. Munnell, Anthony Webb & Francesca
Golub-Sass, The National Retirement Risk Index After the Crash, B.C. CTR.
RIT. RESEARCH, 2009, at 2 figure 1, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2009/10/IB_9-22.pdf (explaining, however, that future retirees will
have to wait longer to reach full-retirement age, they are projected to face
higher Medicare Part B premiums, and a greater portion of their Social
Security retirement benefits will be subject to income taxation).
23. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 15.
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individuals who have not yet reached full retirement age but who
continue to work after starting to draw Social Security retirement
benefits.24
Similarly, workers who retire before their full retirement age
have their benefits actuarially reduced.25 On the other hand,
benefits payable to workers who choose to retire after their full
retirement age are actuarially increased up to age 70.26 In effect,
beneficiaries can buy additional annuity protection by delaying
retirement.27 For example, consider a worker who reached age 62
in January 2013 and earned the maximum taxable amount under
Social Security for every year of her working life. If she claims her
Social Security benefits at 62, she will get $1,923 per month.28 If
she instead waits until she is 65, she will get $2,414 per month,
and if she waits until age 70, she will get $3,350 per month.
Further, any additional years of work may boost the measure of
lifetime earnings used to determine monthly benefits.29
Spouses, dependents, and survivors of the worker may also
receive additional monthly benefits, which are based on the
worker’s benefit.30 For example, a retirement-aged wife or
husband of a retired worker is typically entitled to a monthly

24. 42 U.S.C. § 403(f) (2006).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 402(q) (2006).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 402(w) (2006).
27. See generally Kenn Beam Tacchino, David A. Littell & Bruce D.
Schobel, A Decision Framework for Optimizing the Social Security Claiming
Age, 28(2) BENEFITS Q. 40, 45 (2012); Mary Beth Franklin, 5 Steps to a Secure
Retirement, KIPLINGER’S PERS. FIN. (Oct. 2011) available at http://
www.kiplinger.com/magazine/archives/5-steps-to-a-secure-retirement.html;
Ann Tergesen, How to Make Your Nest Egg Last Longer, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19,
2011
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203802204577066164082847438.html; C. Eugene Steuerle
& Richard B. Fisher, Social Security as a Source of Annuities: A Simplified
Social Security Option (Paper presented at the Pension Rights Center
conference on Re-Imagining Pensions, Washington, DC, 2012) available at
http://www.pensionrights.org/what-we-do/events/re-imagining-pensions/socialsecurity-annuities; Phillip Moeller, How Delaying Retirement Can Help You,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. MONEY, Apr. 9, 2012, available at http://
money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-best-life/2012/04/09/how-delayingretirement-can-help-you;
Anthony Webb, Making Your Nest Egg Last a Lifetime (AARP PUB. POLICY
INST., Insight on the Issues No. 132, 2009) available at http://assets.aarp.org/
rgcenter/ppi/econ-sec/i32.pdf.
28. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AUTOMATIC DETERMINATIONS:
WORKERS WITH MAXIMUM–TAXABLE EARNINGS, (Oct. 18, 2012) available at
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/COLA/examplemax.html.
29. Supra note 18; Laurence Kotlikoff, Inside Social Security’s Obscure
Incentive to Keep Americans Working, YAHOO! FIN., (Feb. 4, 2013) available at
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/inside-social-security-obscureincentive-keep-americans-working-224727054.html.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b) (wife), (c) (husband), (d) (child), (e) (widow), (f) (widower),
(g) (mother and father), and (h) (parents).
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spousal benefit equal to fifty percent of the worker’s benefit.31 In
addition, a retirement-aged widow or widower of the worker is
entitled to a monthly surviving spouse benefit equal to one
hundred percent of the worker’s benefit.32
In addition, a means-tested Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program provides monthly cash benefits to certain lowincome elderly, disabled, or blind Americans. In 2013, the
maximum federal benefit for a single individual is $710 per month,
and the maximum for a couple is $1,066 per month.33 In January
2013, over two million elderly Americans received SSI benefits
from the federal government, and the average monthly benefit was
$422.17.34
B. The Private Pension System
The United States has a voluntary pension system, and
employers have considerable choice about whether and how to
provide pension benefits to their employees. However, when
employers decide to provide a pension, those pensions are typically
subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).35
1. Retirement Savings are Tax-Favored
Most pension plans qualify for favorable tax treatment. An
employer’s contributions to a tax-qualified retirement plan on
behalf of an employee are not taxable to the employee.36 Moreover,
the pension fund’s earnings on those contributions are taxexempt.37 Workers pay tax only when they receive distributions of
their pension benefits.38 Nevertheless, the employer is allowed a
31. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (2006).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), (f) (2006).
33. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SSI FEDERAL PAYMENTS FOR 2013
(2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSI.html (last visited Apr. 13,
2013).
34. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 14.
35. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 864; see generally JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE TAX
TREATMENT OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS JCX-32-12, (Apr. 13, 2012) available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4418.
36. I.R.C. § 402 (2006).
37. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006).
38. See I.R.C. §§ 72, 402 (2006). Pension benefits or annuity payments may
be fully taxable or partially taxable. For example, a participant’s pension
benefits will be fully taxable if the participant’s employer contributed all of the
cost for the pension without any of the contributions being included in the
employee’s taxable wages. Id. Pension benefits would also be fully taxable if
the participant has already received all of her previously taxed contributions
tax-free in previous years. Id; see generally Pension and Annuity Income,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. Pub. No. 575, 2013 available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf.
On the other hand, if an individual made after-tax contributions to a
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current deduction for its contributions (within limits).39
Favorable tax rules are also available for individual
retirement accounts (IRAs).40 Almost any worker can set up an
IRA with a bank or other financial institution. In 2013, individuals
without pension plans can contribute and deduct up to $5,500 to
an IRA, although individuals over age 50 can contribute and
deduct another $1,000 (for a total of up to $6,500); and spouses can
contribute and deduct similar amounts.41 If a worker is covered by
another retirement plan, however, the deduction may be reduced
or eliminated if the worker’s income exceeds $59,000 for a single
individual or $95,000 for a married couple.42 Like private pensions,
IRA earnings are tax-exempt, and distributions are taxable.43
Since 1998, individuals have been permitted to set up Roth
IRAs.44 Unlike regular IRAs, contributions to Roth IRAs are not
deductible. Instead, withdrawals are tax-free. Like regular IRAs,
however, Roth IRA earnings are tax-exempt.
Since 2002, certain low- and moderate-income individuals
have been able to claim a tax credit of up to $1,000 for certain
qualified retirement savings contributions.45 Finally, qualified
pension or annuity, she can exclude part of her pension or annuity
distributions from income. Under I.R.C. §§ 72 and 402, the individual can
exclude a fraction of each benefit payment from income. That fraction (the
“exclusion ratio”) is based on the amount of premiums or other after-tax
contributions made by the individual. Id. The exclusion ratio enables the
individual to recover her own after-tax contributions tax free and to pay tax
only on the remaining portion of benefits which represents income. Id.
Taxpayers who began receiving annuity payments from a qualified
retirement plan after November 18, 1996, generally can use the so-called
Simplified Method to figure the tax-free part of their benefits. Under the
Simplified Method, the Code provides a table with a fixed number of
anticipated payments that depends upon the annuitant’s age as of the annuity
starting date. The taxpayer then divides the total cost over the applicable
number of anticipated payments and excludes the amount so determined each
year. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra at 12-14.
39. I.R.C. § 404 (2006).
40. I.R.C. § 219 (2006).
41. IRS Announces 2013 Pension Plan Limitations: Taxpayers May
Contribute up to $17,500 to their 401(k) plans in 2013, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. IR-2012-77, Oct. 18, 2012 available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/
IR-12-077.pdf.
42. Id.
43. Retirement Plans for Small Business (SEP, Simple, and Qualified
Plans), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Pub. No. 560, 2013 at 2, 12 available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p560.pdf.
44. I.R.C. § 408A (2006).
45. I.R.C. § 25B (2006). The credit equals a percentage (50%, 20%, or 10%)
of up to $2,000 of contributions. In effect, the credit acts like an employer
match: the government matches a portion of the employee’s contributions.
Employer matches encourage workers to contribute, at least up to the match
level, and the saver’s tax credit seems to have similar pro-savings effects. Lisa
Southwirth & John Gist, The Saver’s Credit: What Does It Do For Saving?
AARP PUB. POLICY INST., 2008 available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/
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small firms may claim a nonrefundable tax credit of up to $500 a
year for up to three years for certain costs incurred in setting up a
new retirement plan for employees.46
2. Types of Pension Plans
Pension plans generally fall into two broad categories based
on the nature of the benefits provided: (1) defined benefit plans;
and (2) defined contribution plans.
a. Defined Benefit Plans
In a defined benefit plan, an employer promises employees a
specific benefit at retirement. To provide that benefit, the
employer typically makes payments into a trust fund where
contributed funds grow with investment returns. Eventually, the
employer withdraws funds from the trust fund to pay the promised
benefits. Employer contributions are based on actuarial
valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks and
responsibilities.
Defined benefit plans often provide each worker with a
specific annual retirement benefit tied to the worker’s final
average compensation and number of years of service. For
example, a plan might provide that a worker’s annual retirement
benefit (B) is equal to 2% times the number of years of service (yos)
times final average compensation (fac) (B = 2% × yos × fac). Under
this final-average-pay formula, a worker who retires after 30 years
of service with final average compensation of $50,000 would
receive a pension of $30,000 a year for life. ($30,000 = 2% × 30 yos
× $50,000 fac). Final average compensation is often computed by
averaging the worker’s salary over the last three or five years prior
to retirement.47 While many defined benefit plans allow for lump
sum distributions, the default benefit for defined benefit plans is a
retirement income stream in the form of an annuity for life.48

econ/i1_credit.pdf.
46. I.R.C. § 45E (2006); see Gary Guenther, Small Business Tax Benefits:
Overview and Economic Rationales, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Paper No.
RL32254, 2008 at 17, available at http://royce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
small%20business%20tax%20benefits.pdf (explaining that the credit is equal
to 50% of up to $1,000 in eligible costs incurred in each of the first three years
of the plan’s existence).
47. Alternatively, some plans use career average compensation instead of
final average compensation. Under a career earnings formula, benefits are
based on a percentage of an average of career earnings for every year of
service by the employee.
48. In the United States, defined benefit plans are generally designed to
provide annuities, i.e., “definitely determinable benefits . . . over a period of
years, usually for life after retirement.” Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1).
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b. Defined Contribution Plans
Under a typical defined contribution plan, the employer
simply withholds a specified percentage of the worker’s
compensation and contributes it to an individual investment
account for the worker. For example, contributions might be set at
10% of annual compensation. Under such a plan, a worker who
earned $50,000 in a given year would have $5,000 contributed to
an individual investment account for her benefit. ($5,000 = 10% ×
$50,000). Her benefit at retirement would be based on all such
contributions plus investment earnings.49
Unlike traditional defined benefit plans, defined contribution
plans usually make distributions in the form of lump sum or
periodic distributions rather than life annuities. Indeed, relatively
few defined contribution plans even offer annuity options, and
relatively few participants elect those annuity options.50
In the United States, there are a variety of different types of
defined contribution plans, including money purchase pension
plans, target benefit plans, profit-sharing plans, stock bonus plans,
and employee stock ownership plans (ESOP).51 Of particular note,
profit-sharing and stock bonus plans often include a feature that
allows workers to choose between receiving cash currently or
deferring taxation by placing the money in a retirement account
according to Internal Revenue Code section 401(k). Consequently,
these plans are often called “401(k) plans,” and they are the most

49. See Lynn Miller, The Ongoing Growth of Defined Contribution and
Individual Account Plans: Issues and Implications, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
RESEARCH INST., Mar., 2002 available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/
0302ib.pdf (showing that defined contribution plans are also known as
“individual account” plans because each worker has her own account, as
opposed to defined benefit plans, where the plan’s assets are pooled for the
benefit of all of the employees).
50. BEVERLY I. ORTH, APPROACHES FOR PROMOTING VOLUNTARY
ANNUITIZATION,(Nov. 17, 2008) available at http://www.soa.org/library/
monographs/retirement-systems/retirement2020/2008/november/mono-2008m-rs08-01-orth.pdf; Paul Yakoboski, Retirees, Annuitization and Defined
Contribution Plans, TIAA-CREF INST., Apr. 2010, at 3, 5, available at http://
www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp_docs/
documents/document/tiaa02029462.pdf (finding that only around 19% of
retirees with significant defined contribution plan assets but little defined
benefit pension income annuitized a portion of their retirement savings);
David L. Wray, Testimony before the ERISA Advisory Council Working Group
on Spend Down of Defined Contribution Assets as Retirement, July 16, 2008, at
5 available at http://www.psca.org/psca-president-testified-july-16-2008before-the-erisa-advisory-council-on-the-spend-down-of-defined-contributionassets-at-retirement (noting that only about 20% of defined contribution plans
offer annuities, and these are hardly ever utilized).
51. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Six Ways to
Save for Retirement, 3(3) PROGRAM PERSP. 1, 2 (2011) available at http://
www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_vol3_issue3.pdf.
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popular type of retirement plan in the United States.52 The
maximum annual amount of such elective deferrals that can be
made by an individual in 2013 is $17,500, although workers over
the age of 50 can contribute another $5,500 (for a total of up to
$23,000).53 Also, since 2006, employers have been permitted to set
up Roth 401(k) plans that work like Roth IRAs.54
c.

Hybrid Retirement Plans

So-called “hybrid” retirement plans mix the features of
defined benefit and defined contribution plans. For example, a
cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that looks like a
defined contribution plan.55 Like other defined benefit plans,
employer contributions in a cash balance plan are based on
actuarial valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment
risks and responsibilities. Like defined contribution plans,
however, cash balance plans provide workers with individual
accounts.56 A simple cash balance plan might allocate 10% of
salary to each worker’s account each year and credit the account
with 5% interest on the balance in the account. Under such a plan,
a worker who earned $50,000 in a given year would get an annual
cash balance credit of $5,000 ($5,000 = 10% × $50,000), plus an
interest credit equal to 5% of the balance in her hypothetical
account as of the beginning of the year. The interest credit on a
cash balance plan may also be tied to a market rate, like the longterm interest rate, in which case the plan participant bears some
interest risk.
d. Other Voluntary Savings Mechanisms
In addition to voluntary savings through 401(k) elections and
IRAs, individuals can also save money outside of the retirement
system. Investment income is generally subject to federal personal
income tax rates of up to 39.6% in 2013;57 however, dividend
income and capital gains are generally taxed at no more than a
20% rate.58 Also, there are various tax advantages associated with
investments in homes,59 state and local bonds,60 annuities,61 and

52. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS examines
popular 401(k) retirement plans 2(6) PROGRAM PERSP. 1, 4 (2006) available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_vol2_issue6.pdf.
53. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 41.
54. I.R.C. § 402A (2006).
55. Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan
Conversions, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 381 (2000).
56. Sometimes, these hypothetical accounts are referred to as “notional
accounts.”
57. I.R.C. § 1 (2006).
58. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006).
59. I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 121 (2006). For example, home mortgage interest is
generally deductible, and gains from the sale of a personal residence are often
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life insurance.62
3. The Regulation of Employment-Based Plans
Since it was enacted almost forty years ago, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) has been amended
numerous times, and a whole regulatory system has grown up to
enforce its provisions. The key agencies charged with the
administration of ERISA are the U.S. Department of Labor, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC).63 The IRS and the Department of Labor also
have significant responsibilities with respect to IRAs and Roth
IRAs.
Pension plans must be operated for the exclusive benefit of
employees and beneficiaries, and plan assets generally must be
held in a trust.64 To protect the interests of plan participants,
ERISA requires significant reporting and disclosure in the
administration and operation of employee benefit plans.65 ERISA
also imposes extensive fiduciary responsibilities on employers and
administrators of employee benefit plans.66 In addition, prohibited
transaction rules prevent parties in interest from engaging in
certain transactions with the plan.67 For example, an employer
usually cannot sell, exchange, or lease any property to the plan.
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code impose many other
requirements on retirement plans, including rules governing
participation, coverage, vesting, benefit accrual, contribution and
benefits, nondiscrimination, and funding.
a. Participation
A pension plan generally may not require that an employee
excludable.
60. I.R.C. § 103 (2006) (interest exclusion).
61. Under I.R.C. § 72, the individual can exclude a fraction of each annuity
payment from income. That fraction (the “exclusion ratio”) is based on the
amount of premiums or other after-tax contributions made by the individual.
Id. The exclusion ratio enables the individual to recover her own after-tax
contributions tax free and to pay tax only on the remaining portion of benefits,
which represents income. Id.
62. See I.R.C. § 101(a) (2013) (explaining the exclusion for insurance
proceeds paid by reason of the death of the insured).
63. Internal Revenue Service, Tax Information for Retirement Plans
Community, available at http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans (last visited
Apr. 18, 2013); U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security
Administration, About the Employee Benefits Security Administration,
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/main.html (last visited Jan.
31, 2013); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, About PBGC, available at
http://www.pbgc.gov/about (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
64. I.R.C. § 401(a) (2006); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1104(a)(1)(A) (2006).
65. ERISA §§ 101(a) et seq.
66. I.R.C. § 401(a) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006); ERISA § 404.
67. I.R.C. § 4975 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006); ERISA § 406.
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complete a period of service extending beyond the later of age 21 or
one year of service as a condition of participation.68 Also, a plan
may not exclude employees from participation just because they
have reached a certain age (e.g., age 65). Employees can be
excluded for other reasons. For example, a plan might be able to
cover only those employees working at a particular location or in a
particular job category.
b. Coverage
Under the minimum coverage rules, a pension plan usually
must cover a significant percentage of the employer’s workforce.69
For example, the ratio percentage test compares the percentage of
highly compensated employees covered under a pension plan to
the percentage of non-highly compensated employees covered by
the plan. More specifically, the percentage of non-highly
compensated employees who are covered must be at least 70% of
the percentage of highly compensated employees who are covered.
Alternatively, a plan may be able to satisfy the minimum coverage
rules if it benefits a certain class of employees, as long as it does
not discriminate in favor of the employer’s highly compensated
employees.
c.

Vesting

Pension plans must also meet certain minimum vesting
requirements.70 A worker’s retirement benefit vests when the
worker has a non-forfeitable right to receive the benefit. For
example, under the five-year cliff-vesting schedule, an employee
who has completed at least five years of service must have a nonforfeitable right to one hundred percent of her accrued benefits.
ERISA only imposes minimum vesting requirements, and plans
are free to use a faster vesting schedule.
d. Benefit Accrual
In keeping with the voluntary nature of our pension system,
employers have great freedom in the design of their pension plans.
ERISA does not mandate any specific benefit levels, nor does it
require that benefits accrue evenly over time. Minimum benefit
accrual rules do, however, limit the extent to which employers can
‘backload’ benefits in favor of their long-service employees.71

68. I.R.C. § 410(a) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006); ERISA § 202.
69. I.R.C. § 410(b) (2006).
70. I.R.C. § 411(a) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006); ERISA § 203.
71. I.R.C. § 411(b) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006); ERISA § 204. A typical
plan must comply with at least one of three alternative minimum benefit
accrual rules. For example, under the “3% method,” a worker must accrue, for
each year of participation (up to 33 and 1/3 years) at least 3% of the normal
retirement benefit that she would receive if she stayed with the employer until
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Another benefit accrual rule bars employers from reducing or
ceasing an employee’s benefit accrual rate because the employee
has reached a certain age (for example, age 65). Yet, employers
are permitted to design their plans in ways that result in benefit
reductions that merely correlate with age, for example, by
restricting the number of years of benefit accrual (for example, to
30 years).72
e.

Contributions and Benefits

The Internal Revenue Code also imposes limits on
contributions and benefits.73 In 2013, for example, generally no
more than the lesser of $51,000 or 25% of compensation can be
added to the individual account of a participant in a defined
contribution plan.74 Also, as already mentioned, the maximum
annual amount of elective deferrals that can be made by an
individual to a 401(k)-type plan in 2013 is $17,500, although
workers over the age of 50 can contribute up to another $5,500.75
With defined benefit plans, the highest annual benefit that can be
paid to a retiree in 2013 is the lesser of $205,000 or one hundred
percent of the employee’s compensation.76 The highest amount of
compensation that can be considered in determining contributions
or benefits in 2013 is $230,000.77
f.

Nondiscrimination

In addition to the minimum coverage rules described above,
complicated nondiscrimination rules ensure that neither
contributions nor benefits discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees.78 Special, less rigorous nondiscrimination
rules apply to 401(k) plans.79 For example, a “safe harbor” 401(k)
plan can meet the nondiscrimination requirements if the employer
contributes 3% of compensation for all eligible employees or,
alternatively, if the employer matches employee contributions

age 65. I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(A) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(A) (2006), ERISA §
204(b)(1)(A).
72. I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(H) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H) (2006); ERISA §
204(b)(1)(H).
73. I.R.C. § 415 (2006). These limits appear only in the Internal Revenue
Code, and they reflect the government’s desire to limit the ability of highincome workers to utilize the tax benefits of pension plans. Id.
74. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 41.
75. Id.
76. I.R.C. § 415(b) (2006); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 41.
77. I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (2006); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 41.
78. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (2006). Also, plans that provide more than 60% of
accrued benefits to key employees are considered top-heavy and must meet
more generous minimum vesting and benefit-accrual requirements. I.R.C. §
416 (2006).
79. I.R.C. § 401(k)(3) (2006).
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(generally totaling up to 4% of compensation).80
g. Funding
Retirement plans must also meet certain minimum funding
standards.81 These rules help ensure that the money needed to pay
the promised benefits is set aside in a trust fund where it can earn
income until it is used to pay benefits when the employee retires.
ERISA created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to
administer a new plan termination insurance program. Defined
benefit plans generally pay annual termination insurance
premiums to the PBGC. In the event an underfunded plan
terminates (for example, because the employer went out of
business), the PBGC guarantees payment of up to $57,477.24 in
pension benefits to a 65-year-old participant in 2013.82
4. The Dominance of Defined Contribution Plans
In recent years, defined contribution plans have come to
dominate the pension landscape. For example, fifty percent of fulltime private industry workers in the United States participated in
defined contribution plans in 2011, up from 40% around 1989-90.
Meanwhile, participation in defined benefit plans fell from 42%
around 1989-90 to 22% in 2011.83 A recent study estimated that
92% of the new pension plans formed between 2003 to 2007 were
defined contribution plans, as opposed to defined benefit plans.84
80. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 43, at 17.
81. I.R.C. § 412 (2006), 29 U.S.C. § 302 (2006); ERISA § 302.
82. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, Maximum Monthly
Guarantee Tables, available at http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteedbenefits/maximum-guarantee.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
83. William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-based
Retirement Benefits, COMP. & WORKING COND. ONLINE, Sept. 29, 2011
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20110927ar01p1.htm; William J.
Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, 135
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 (2012) available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/
12/art1full.pdf; TOWERS WATSON, GLOBAL PENSION ASSET STUDY 2012 8, 3436, (Jan. 2012) available at http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/ICTypes/Survey-Research-Results/2012/01/Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2012
(finding that defined contribution plans held 57% of pension assets in the
United States in 2011, up from 52% in 2001).
More specifically, there were 701,012 private pension plans in 2010.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, PRIVATE
PENSION PLAN BULLETIN 1 (2012) available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/
2010pensionplanbulletin.PDF. These are ERISA-covered plans and do not
include non-ERISA plans such as IRAs and Roth IRAs. Of these, just 46,543
were defined benefit plans (with 41.4 million participants and $2.5 trillion in
assets), while 654,469 were defined contribution plans (with 88.3 million
participants and $3.8 trillion in assets). Id., at 1, tbl. 2.A1. Of those defined
contribution plans, 519,000 were 401(k)-type plans. Id. at 1.
84. Private Pensions: Some Key Features Lead to an Uneven Distribution of
Benefits, GAO, Mar. 2011, at 12 fig. 2; Use of Tax Incentives for Retirement
Saving in 2006, CBO, 2011 available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
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Pertinent here, employers may be responding to the relatively
higher costs of providing a defined benefit plan as opposed to a
defined contribution plan. For example, according to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, it cost an average of $2.53 an hour to provide
each participating worker with a defined benefit plan in March
2012, compared with just $1.46 per hour for defined contribution
plan participants.85 That said, defined benefit plans incur
investment fees and other charges that defined contribution plans
do not incur or can pass on to their participants. All in all, the era
of the traditional defined benefit plan is largely behind us.86
III. HOW MUCH WILL WORKERS NEED IN RETIREMENT?
A. Sources of Income of the Aged
Social Security is the most common source of income for
households age 65 or older. For example, in 2010, 86.3% of
households age 65 or older received Social Security benefits.87
Moreover, Social Security provided more than half of total income
for 53.1% of aged beneficiary couples and 74.1% of aged single
beneficiaries.88 Just 39.7% of households received retirement
benefits from sources other than Social Security, and 51.9%
received income from other assets.89
cbofiles/attachments/2011-10-14-TaxIncentives.pdf.
85. Retirement costs for defined benefit plans higher than for defined
contribution plans, 1(21) BEYOND THE NUMBERS: PAY & BENEFITS 2, 3 (2012)
available
at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-1/retirement-costs-fordefined-benefit-plans-higher-than-for-defined-contribution-plans.htm.
86. See generally EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP
SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA
(2004); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114(3) YALE
L.J. 451, 457 (2004); see generally GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE, THE
DECLINE OF THE TRADITIONAL PENSION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREATS
TO RETIREMENT SECURITY (2010); Janice Kay McClendon, The Death Knell of
Traditional Defined Benefit Plans: Avoiding a Race to the 401(k) Bottom, 80(3)
TEMP. L. REV. 809, 813 (2007); Barbara A. Butrica, Howard M. Iams, Karen E.
Smith & Eric J. Toder, The Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and Its
Potential Impact on the Retirement Incomes of Baby Boomers, 69(3) SOC. SEC.
BULLETIN 1, 2 (2009).
87. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK,
2010 8 (2012) available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/
income_aged/2010/iac10.pdf; Sudipto Banerjee, Income Composition, Income
Trends, and Income Shortfalls of Older Households, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH
INST., Issue Brief No. 383, 2013 available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/
EBRI_IB_02-13.No383.IncmEld.pdf; Barbara A. Butrica & Mikki D. Waid,
What Are the Retirement Prospects of Middle-Class Americans? (AARP PUB.
POLICY INST., Middle Class Security Project Paper No. 2013-01, 2013)
available
at
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/
public_policy_institute/security/2013/retirement-prospects-middle-classAARP-ppi-sec.pdf.
88. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 87, at 9.
89. Id. at 8.
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Social Security provides a share of income to the elderly that
is larger than that of any other income source—36.7% of aggregate
income in 2010.90 Earnings accounted for another 30.2% of
aggregate income that year, pensions for 18.6%, and asset income
for 11.4%.91 It is important to note that the shares of aggregate
income from each source differ greatly by income level. For
example, households in the bottom 20% of aggregate income got
84.3% of their income from Social Security benefits and just 2.9%
from pensions and 2.4% from earnings in 2010.92 See Figure 3.
Meanwhile, earnings accounted for 44.9% of the income of
households in the top 20%, while Social Security provided just
17.3% and pensions provided just 19.1%.93

B. Coverage and Retirement Income Adequacy
To encourage Americans to save for retirement in our
voluntary pension system, the government relies on two major
approaches. First, most pension plans qualify for favorable tax
treatment. Second, employers and workers have flexibility in
designing their pension plans, making contributions, and making
(or taking) distributions. Despite those incentives, coverage and
participation are low, and retirement savings may be inadequate
for many retirees.
Indeed, at any point in time, only about one out of two
American workers have pension plans, and few can be confident
that they will have enough income to meet their economic needs

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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throughout retirement. For example, of the 153.7 million
Americans workers in 2011, just 75.2 million (48.9%) worked for
an employer or union that sponsored a retirement plan, and just
61.0 million (39.7%) participated in that plan.94 Table 1 provides
more details about employer sponsorship of retirement plans in
2011 and worker participation in those plans.95 It is important to
note that the probability of pension coverage is greater for older
workers, for whites, for highly educated workers, for full-time
workers, for higher-income workers, and for workers at larger
firms. Participation rates increase through age 55 and then
declined. Among older workers age 55 to 64, only 49.9% participate
in a pension plan.
TABLE 1. SHARE OF WORKERS WITH AN EMPLOYER THAT
SPONSORED A RETIREMENT PLAN AND SHARE PARTICIPATING IN
THE PLAN, BY VARIOUS CHARACTERISTICS, 2011 (PERCENT)
Worker
Sponsorship
Percentage
characteristic
rate
participating
AGE
20 or younger
21–24
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
65 and older

20.4
34.2
47.7
52.8
55.3
56.2
40.8

3.9
16.2
36.4
45.3
49.0
49.9
31.4

GENDER
Male
Female

48.3
49.6

39.9
39.4

94. Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation:
Geographic Differences and Trends, 2011 9 fig. 1, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH
INST., Issue Brief No. 378, 2012 available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/
EBRI_IB_10-2011_No363_Ret_Part.pdf. Some caution in relying on these
participation and coverage figures may be appropriate, as the Census Bureau’s
Current Population Survey (CPS) is based on asking people what they
remember about their financial circumstances and may underestimate
pension plan coverage and participation. In that regard, several studies
suggest that the CPS underestimates the amount and prevalence of
retirement distributions received by retirees. Anguelov et al., supra note 6; see
generally John Sabelhaus & Daniel Schrass, The Evolving Role of IRAs in U.S.
Retirement Planning, 15(3) INV. CO. INST. RESEARCH PERSP. (2009) available
at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per15-03.pdf; Sylvester J. Schieber, Why Do Pension
Benefits Seem So Small?, 11(4) BENEFITS Q. 57 (1995); Michela Coppola &
Bettina Lamia, Empirical Research on Households’ Saving and Retirement
Security: First Steps towards an Innovative Triple-Linked-Dataset, 2012
available at http://mea.mpisoc.mpg.de/uploads/user_mea_discussionpapers/
1272_258-12.pdf.
95. Copeland, supra note 94, at 10-11 fig. 2.
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White
Black
Hispanic
Other
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52.7
49.6
32.5
47.1

43.6
38.1
24.2
37.4

22.4
42.7
49.0
58.7
68.1

13.6
33.1
37.9
50.6
61.6

WORK STATUS
Full-time, full-year
Full-time, part-year
Part-time, full-year
Part-time, part-year

57.5
40.1
31.8
23.9

50.6
27.3
18.4
8.5

ANNUAL EARNINGS
Less than $10,000
$10,000–$19,999
$20,000–$29,999
$30,000–$39,999
$40,000–$49,999
$50,000–$74,999
$75,000 or more

21.1
29.6
44.3
54.3
62.2
68.2
69.9

6.9
16.1
32.4
45.7
55.6
62.7
66.7

EMPLOYER SIZE
Fewer than 10 employees
10–49 employees
50–99 employees
100–499 employees
500–999 employees
1,000 or more employees
Public sector

13.8
29.6
43.4
54.5
60.6
65.3
79.3

11.3
23.0
33.4
42.5
47.8
51.4
70.6

EDUCATION
No high school diploma
High school diploma
Some college
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate/professional
degree

Source: Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan
Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends, 2011 9 fig. 1, Emp.
Benefit Research Inst., Issue Brief No. 378, 2012 available at http://
www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10-2011_No363_Ret_Part.pdf.

Participation in IRA plans is even lower than participation
in pension plans. For example, only 28.0% of American families
had an IRA or Keogh plans for the self-employed in 2010.96 As
96. Craig Copeland, Individual Account Retirement Plans: An Analysis of
the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances 10 fig. 5, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH
INST., Issue Brief No. 375, 2012 available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/
EBRI_IB_09-2012_No375_IndvAccts.pdf. Of note rollover IRAs accounted for
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with employment-based plans, participation in IRAs and Keoghs
tends to be higher among those families where the head of the
family is older, has attained a higher educational level, or has a
higher income level.97
Certainly, most households will accumulate some retirement
savings through current or past work over their lifetime.
According to the Survey of Consumer Finances, 55.1% of families
had rights to some retirement plan other than Social Security
through current or past work of the family head or that person’s
spouse or partner in 2010.98 Moreover, as households get closer to
retirement age, they are even more likely to have accumulated
some retirement assets, and recent cohorts of retirees tend to have
more retirement assets than previous cohorts.99 Households
headed by a working individual aged 55 to 64 are doing especially
well. These near-retiree households are less likely to be covered by
a defined benefit plan than previous cohorts, but about 70% of
them had defined contribution plans and/or IRAs, and the median
amount of their total retirement accumulations was $101,350 in
2010, up from just $63,719 in 2001 (in 2010 dollars).100
Still, low participation rates in pension plans, in general, and
low contributions rates to 401(k) plans, in particular, have led
many analysts to wonder whether current and future generations
of retirees will have adequate retirement incomes.101 For example,
43.2% of all IRA and Keogh assets. Id. at 1. A Keogh is a tax-deferred
retirement plan for self-employed individuals and their employees (if any). Id.
at 27, n. 24.
97. Id. at 18 fig. 12a, 19fig. 12b.
98. Jesse Bricker, Arthur B. Kennickell, Kevin B. Moore & John
Sabelhaus, Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98(2) FED. RESERVE BULL. 37, 38
(2012) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/
scf12.pdf.
99. Brady et al., supra note 22, at 12.
100. Id.
101. Pension Savings: Are Workers Saving Enough for Retirement?: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 113th
Cong. (Jan. 31, 2013) available at http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/
hearing/?id=4cd69c00-5056-a032-52b4-2693a6672740; see Jack VanDerhei,
The Importance of Defined Benefit Plans for Retirement Income Adequacy,
32(8) EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. NOTES 7, 8 (2011) available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_08_August11.PPACA_DBplans.pdf (showing that having a defined benefit plan at age 65
significantly reduces the risk that retirement income will be inadequate);
Melissa M. Favreault, Richard W. Johnson, Karen E. Smith & Sheila R.
Zedlewski, Boomers’ Retirement Income Prospects, URBAN INST., Brief No. 34,
2012
available
at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412490-boomersretirement-income-prospects.pdf (explaining that 4 out of 10 late babyboomers will lack sufficient income at age 79 to replace 75% of what they
earned between ages 50 and 54); Munnell et. al, supra note 22 (showing that
half of households will not have enough retirement income to maintain their
pre-retirement living standards); Jack VanDerhei, Retirement Income
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according to recent research by the Employee Benefit Research
Institute, 44% of “Baby-Boomer” and “Gen-X” households are at
risk of running short of money in retirement. Further, 19.4% of
them are projected to have less than 80% of what they will need.102
It is clear that Americans are not saving enough for retirement. In
that regard, for example, a recent study by the Life Insurance and
Market Research Association (LIMRA) showed that two-thirds of
middle-income ($40,000-$99,999) American workers were saving
less than five percent of their annual income for retirement, and
nearly a quarter were saving nothing at all.103
Even the most optimistic analysts see problems for people
who retire earlier than expected because of poor health, for people
with limited work histories, and for unmarried people (never
married, divorced, or widowed).104 Finally, even more retirees
could be put at risk if Social Security and Medicare benefits are
curtailed in connection with the federal government’s efforts to get
the national debt under control105 or if medical breakthroughs

Adequacy for Boomers and Gen Xers: Evidence from the 2012 EBRI Retirement
Security Projection Model®, 33(5) EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. NOTES
2, 4 (2012) available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_05_May12.RSPM-ER.Cvg1.pdf.
102. Jack VanDerhei, All or Nothing?
An Expanded Perspective on
Retirement Readiness, 33(11) EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. NOTES 1,
11
(2012)
available
at
http://www.ebri.org/publications/notes/
index.cfm?fa=notesDisp&content_id=5131; see Alicia H. Munnell, Anthony
Webb & Francesca Golub-Sass, The National Retirement Risk Index: An
Update, Boston College Center for Retirement Research, Issue in Brief 12-20,
2012) available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/IB_12-20.pdf
(estimating that some 53% of households will have replacement rates that fall
more than 10% below the target).
103. LIFE INSURANCE AND MARKET RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (LIMRA), Most
Middle-Income Workers Saving Less Than Five Percent of Their Income for
Retirement (Oct. 31, 2012) available at http://www.limra.com/newscenter/
NewsArchive/ArchiveDetails.aspx?prid=269 (last visited Feb. 27, 2013); see
also HSBC INSURANCE HOLDINGS LIMITED, THE FUTURE OF RETIREMENT: A
NEW
REALITY
26
fig.
11
(2013)
available
at
http://www.hsbc.com/~/media/HSBC-com/about-hsbc/structure-andnetwork/retirement/global-reports/130220for7pagespdf.ashx (finding that 31%
of Americans surveyed have never saved for retirement).
104. Brady et al., supra note 21, at 39; see John Karl Scholz, Ananth
Seshadri & Suurachai Khitatrakun, Are Americans Saving ‘Optimally’ for
Retirement?, 114(4) J. OF POL. ECON. 607, 620 (2006) (predicting that less than
20% of households will have less retirement wealth than optimal); Austin
Nichols, Do Financial Planners Advise Us to Save Too Much for Retirement?
(Urban Institute, Program on Retirement Policy Paper, 2012) available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412510-Do-Financial-Planners-AdviseUs-to-Save-Too-Much-for-Retirement.pdf (explaining that Americans are not
necessarily saving too little for retirement).
105. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2012 LONG-TERM
PROJECTIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (2012),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43648SocialSecurity.pdf (noting the difference between “scheduled” and “payable”
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result in significant increases in life expectancy.106
Nevertheless, some observers argue that the comparatively
limited coverage of the second tier is not necessarily a bad thing.107
The fact that coverage is particularly low among younger and less
well-paid workers is thought to reflect the fact that they have
more pressing expenditures to save for, like a down payment on a
house. Lower participation by low-paid workers might reflect a
decision to give priority to spending on current essentials over
saving for retirement. However, even if coverage rates of older and
better-paid workers are higher than those of younger and less
well-paid workers, they remain well below one hundred percent.
Data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances for
2007 show that even in the 50-59 year age ranges, just 61.4% of
workers had pension coverage from their current jobs and just
65.9% had coverage from any job.108 Similarly, just 65.6% of
workers earning between $45,000 and $59,999 in 2007 had
coverage from their current jobs and just 69.6% had coverage from
any job.109
Others who defend the current system argue that the
coverage of the second tier has never been much more than its
current rate of one in two workers.110 They also argue that the long
vesting periods that the traditional pensions required and their
lack of inflation adjustments when workers separated from their
employers meant that workers often received less than generous
payouts.111 This argument is worth considering. Under ERISA, a
Social Security benefits).
106. See, e.g., THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, 2013 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS
79-81,
90-93,
174-17578-80,
88-92
(2013)
available
at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/TR/2013/tr2013.pdf
(discussing
the
derivation of the Social Security Administration’s mortality and life
expectancy assumptions and its long-range sensitivity analysis).
107. See Peter J. Brady, Measuring Retirement Resource Adequacy, 9(2) J.
OF PENSION ECON. 235, 239 (Apr. 2010).
108. Mackenzie & Wu, supra note 6, at 25 tbl. A.1. To be sure, 75.7% had
either a pension or an IRA, and just 24.7% were without any coverage. Id.
109. Id. at 26 tbl. A.2.
110. For the history of private pension coverage see e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, 6 PRIVATE
PENSION PLAN BULLETIN tbl. F4 (1996) available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
publications/bulletin/cover.htm (showing low participation rates from 19751993); Alicia H. Munnell, Rebecca C. Fraenkel & Josh Hurwitz, The Pension
Coverage Problem in the Private Sector, BOSTON COL. CENTR. FOR RET.
RESEARCH, Issue in Brief No. 12-16, 2012 available at http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/IB_12-16.pdf (showing low participation rates from
1979-2010).
111. As an example of the effect of freezing benefits: the benefit that an
employee who separated at age 45, and became eligible for a benefit at age 65
could be expected to decline substantially in real terms: its value would be
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sponsor of a defined benefit plan can set a vesting period of as
much as five years, and many workers have job tenures shorter
than that.112
On the other hand, the switch to defined contribution plans
has almost certainly reduced the degree to which pension benefits
are annuitized.113 Moreover, few workers in today’s defined
contribution plan world will have saved enough to buy a
meaningful annuity at retirement. For example, the median
401(k)-plan balance is $77,000, which could only buy a $5,000-ayear life annuity for a new retiree at current interest rates.114
C. The Decline of Annuitization
The decline in the role of the traditional pension plan has
caused a significant decline in annuitization of retirement savings
by American workers because, unlike defined benefit plans,
defined contribution plans typically distribute benefits in the form
of lump sum distributions rather than as annuities.115 Indeed,
relatively few defined contribution plans even offer annuity
options, and in any event, relatively few participants elect those
annuity options.116
Although a recent survey suggests that older workers with
defined contribution plans are more likely to annuitize part or all
of their balances than has generally been thought, annuitization
remains uncommon.117 Purchases of life annuities by 401(k) plan
fixed in nominal terms, and inflation at an average annual rate of 2% over the
20 years would reduce its value by about one-third. Authors’ computations.
112. See Craig Copeland, Employee Tenure Trend Lines, 1983–2010, 31(12)
http://
EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. NOTES 2 (2010) available at
www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_12-Dec10.Tenure-CEHCS.pdf (finding
that the median tenure for all wage and salary workers age 25 and higher was
just 5.2 years in 2010).
113. Infra Part III.C.
114. Supra notes 6 & 7; see James Poterba, Steven Venti & David Wise, The
Composition and Drawdown of Wealth in Retirement, 25(4) J. OF ECON. PERSP.
99, 96, 103, 113 (Fall 2011) (finding that the median household between the
ages of 65 and 69 in 2008 had less than $52,000 in annuitizable wealth and
that just 47% of elderly households could increase their life-contingent annual
income by more than $5,000 a year).
115. TOWERS WATSON, INTERNATIONAL PENSION PLAN SURVEY: REPORT
2011 1, 15 (2011) available at http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/6036/
TW-EU-2011-22755-IPP-survey.pdf (showing that lump sums distributions are
by far the most prevalent form of distribution for defined contribution plans).
116. Miller, supra note 49.
117. See Carlos Figueiredo & Sandy Mackenzie, Older Americans’
Ambivalence Toward Annuities: Results of an AARP Survey of Pension Plan
and IRA Distribution Choices (AARP Research Report No. 2012-07, 2012)
available
at
http://www.tiaacrefinstitut
e.org/ucm/groups/content/
@ap_ucm_p_tcp_docs/documents/document/tiaa04044741.pdf (noting that the
54th Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans carried out by the Plan
Sponsor Council of America found that 16.6% offered annuities as an option,
while 60.2% offered periodic withdrawals).
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participants from life insurance companies remain rare when the
plan does not offer an annuity option. Purchases from insurance
companies financed by either after-tax or before-tax dollars
amounted to just $7.7 billion in 2012.118 Assuming an average
premium of $100,000, the major life insurance companies had only
77,000 new customers for life annuities.
The problem for many retirees is that lump sum distributions
can be all too easily dissipated. Indeed, one study found that 54%
of those who took lump sum distributions from their retirement
plan had exhausted their savings within three years of
retirement.119 All in all, people rarely buy annuities voluntarily,
even though purchasing annuities could provide valuable longevity
insurance.120 That is, the demand for annuities is lower than
expected, and this shortfall has come to be known as the “annuity
puzzle.”121
There are many reasons for this low demand for annuities.122
Financial literacy is often low among consumers, and distrust of
insurance companies may be a factor.123 Moreover, relatively few
retirees are willing to give up control over their retirement savings
by buying an annuity. Instead, retirees would rather have money
in the bank. Many also want to leave money to their children,
known by economists as a bequest motive. Also, because of adverse
selection (i.e., those that voluntarily purchase annuities tend to
live longer than those that do not), annuities may not be priced
very well for those with normal life expectancies. Finally, it is
important to note that Social Security and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) already provide inflation-adjusted monthly benefits
that may crowd out private annuities.124
118. LIFE INSURANCE AND MARKET RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (LIMRA),
DEFERRED INCOME ANNUITY SALES REACH $1 BILLION; FIXED INDEXED
ANNUITY SALES HIT RECORD HIGH IN 2012 (FEB. 21, 2012) available at http://
www.limra.com/Posts/PR/News_Releases/
LIMRA__Deferred_Income_Annuity_Sales_Reach_$1_Billion;_Fixed_Indexed_
Annuity_Sales_Hit_Record_High_in_2012.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
119. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 115, at 3.
120. MACKENZIE, supra note 86, at 253; Figueiredo, supra note 117.
121. See Manahem E. Yaari, Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the
Theory of the Consumer, 32(2) REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 137, 140 (1965); see
generally Franco Modigliani, Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of
Nations, 76(3) AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1986); see generally Shlomo Benartzi,
Alessandro Previtero & Richard H. Thaler, Annuitization Puzzles, 25(4) J. OF
ECON. PERSP. 143 (Fall 2011).
122. See GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE, ANNUITY MARKETS AND PENSION
REFORM, Chapter 1 (2006) (showing a survey of the influences on annuity
demand).
123. Annamaria Lusardi, Olivia S. Mitchell & Vilsa Curto, Financial
Sophistication in the Older Population (National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 17,863, 2012) available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w17863.
124. Monika Bütler, Kim Peijnenburg & Stefan Staubli, How Much Do
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Of note, the Internal Revenue Service and the U.S.
Department of Labor recently mounted a joint effort to improve
lifetime income options for retirement plans.125 In that regard, the
Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service recently released a
package of proposed regulations and rulings intended to make it
easier for pension plans to offer partial annuities, longevity
annuities, and other lifetime income choices.126
D. Replacement Ratios
As a rule of thumb, after retirement individuals will need to
replace around 80% of their pre-retirement income.127 People will
Means-Tested Benefits Reduce the Demand for Annuities? (Discussion Paper
No. DP 09/2011-52, Network for Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement,
2011) available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=114894.
125. Lifetime Income Options for Participants and Beneficiaries in
Retirement Plans, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 2010 available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/
cmt-1210-AB33.html.
126. Longevity annuities are characterized by a long delay between
premium payments and the first income payment. TREASURY FACT SHEET:
HELPING AMERICAN FAMILIES ACHIEVE RETIREMENT SECURITY BY EXPANDING
LIFETIME INCOME CHOICES (Feb. 2, 2012) available at http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/
020212%20Retirement%20Security%20Factsheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 19,
2013); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISORS, SUPPORTING RETIREMENT FOR AMERICAN FAMILIES 1 (Feb. 2, 2012)
available at http://benefitslink.com/articles/CEA_report_2_2_2012.pdf.
127. AON CONSULTING, 2008 REPLACEMENT RATIO STUDY 24 (2008)
available at http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-capital/attachments/
human-capital-consulting/RRStudy070308.pdf (estimating that required
replacement ratios ranged from 77% for a person earning $80,000 a year in
2008 to 94% for a person earning $20,000 that year); see AON HEWITT, THE
REAL DEAL: 2012 RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY AT LARGE COMPANIES 1
(2012)
available
at
http://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capitalconsulting/The_2012_Real_Deal_Highlights.pdf (showing that to have
sufficient assets to get through retirement, an average full-career employee
needs 11.0 times pay at age 65, after Social Security—85% pay replacement
needed in the first year of retirement); see JOHN KARL SCHOLZ & ANANTH
SESHADRI, WHAT REPLACEMENT RATES SHOULD HOUSEHOLDS USE? 1
(University of Michigan Retirement Research Center Working Paper 2009-24,
2009) available at http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/
wp214.pdf (explaining that “typical advice suggests that replacements rates
should be 70-85% of pre-retirement income”); Patrick J. Purcell, Income
Replacement Ratios in the Health and Retirement Study, 72(3) SOC. SEC. BULL.
37, 42 (2012); see generally Alicia C. Munnell & Mauricio Soto, Sorting Out
Social Security Replacement Rates, JUST THE FACTS, NO. 19 (Boston College
Center for Retirement Research) 2005 available at http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2005/11/jtf_19.pdf;
Patricia
P.
Martin,
Comparing
Replacement Rates under Private and Federal Retirement Systems, 65(1) SOC.
SEC. BULL. (2003/2004) available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n1/
v65n1p17.html; Andrew G. Biggs & Glenn R. Springstead, Alternate Measures
of Replacement Rates for Social Security Benefits and Retirement Income, 68(2)
SOC. SEC. BULL. (2008) available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v68n2/
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generally need less income after retiring because income taxes are
lower after retirement, Social Security payroll taxes end, and
savings for retirement are no longer needed.128 Social Security
(and SSI) will provide a large portion of that replacement income,
but the private pension system and personal savings will need to
provide the rest. For example, Table 2 shows Aon Consulting’s
recent estimates of the replacement rates that would be needed by
married couples with various levels of pre-retirement income.129
TABLE 2. 2008 REPLACEMENT RATIOS
(MARRIED COUPLE, AGES 65/62, ONE WORKING)
Replacement Ratios
PreFrom
From
retirement
Social
private and
income
Security
employer
sources
$20,000
69%
25%
$30,000
59%
31%
$40,000
54%
31%
$50,000
51%
30%
$60,000
46%
32%

Total

94%
90%
85%
81%
78%

$70,000
$80,000

42%
39%

35%
38%

77%
77%

$90,000

36%

42%

78%

Source: AON CONSULTING, 2008 REPLACEMENT RATIO STUDY 24

2008) available at http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectualcapital/attachments/human-capital-consulting/
RRStudy070308.pdf.

Table 3 shows estimates of how large a lump sum is needed at
retirement to provide an adequate income throughout
retirement.130
v68n2p1.html.
Some economists have, however, argued that even a replacement ratio
of 80% is too high. See, e.g., Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Economics’ Approach to
Financial Planning, 21 J. OF FIN. PLANNING 3, 6 (2008) available at http://
kotlikoff.net/content/economics-approach-financial-planning
(arguing that
when certain nonrecurring expenditures by households in the years before
retirement are taken account of, the targeted replacement rate is much less
than the norm); see also Brady, supra note 107, at 239 (estimating
replacement rates that are lower than the norm).
128. AON CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 1-2.
129. Id. at tbl. 2; ANNA RAPPAPORT, VICKIE BAJTELSMIT & LEANDRA
FOSTER, MEASURES OF RETIREMENT BENEFIT ADEQUACY: WHICH, WHY, FOR
WHOM, AND HOW MUCH? 10 tbl. 32 (Society of Actuaries, 2013) available at
http://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Projects/research-2013-measuresretirement.pdf.
130. AON CONSULTING, supra note 127, at tbl. 16.
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TABLE 3. LUMP SUM AMOUNTS NEEDED AT RETIREMENT FROM
PRIVATE AND EMPLOYER SOURCES AS A MULTIPLE OF FINAL PAY
Baseline
Equivalent Lump
Prereplacement rate
Sum Needed
retirement
needed (% of
(as a multiple of final pay)
income
final pay)
Male
Female
$20,000
25%
4.4
4.5
$30,000
31%
5.0
5.5
$40,000
31%
5.0
5.5
$50,000
30%
4.8
5.4
$60,000
32%
5.2
5.7
$70,000
35%
5.6
6.3
$80,000
38%
6.1
6.8
$90,000
42%
6.8
7.5
Source: Aon Consulting, 2008 Replacement Ratio Study 24
(2008) available at http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectualcapital/attachments/human-capital-consulting/
RRStudy070308.pdf.
E. Conclusion: American Workers are not Saving Enough for
Retirement
All in all, studies of the adequacy of retirement income in the
United States have come to different conclusions. Nonetheless, the
comparatively modest balances held in popular 401(k) plans and
IRAs strongly support the view that many American workers are
not saving enough for retirement. To be sure, Social Security
replacement rates are high when incomes are low, but drop off
substantially as incomes rise. The increase in replacement rates
that would be achieved by treating gradual withdrawals of income
from a 401(k) plan or an IRA as income or by including annuity
income purchased with funds from these sources would not be very
great, particularly if the withdrawals and annuity are indexed for
inflation. This suggests that replacement rates, as conventionally
measured, may not be adequate for many retired Americans.
In sum, the current pension system has grave defects. Social
Security, despite its obvious successes, like rescuing millions of
older Americans from poverty,131 cannot be the only tier of
retirement security. Meanwhile, the coverage provided by the
second-tier, private pension system is too far from universal to be
satisfactory. Many retired Americans will have to make do with
little more than their Social Security benefits, and if they live to
an advanced age, those Americans are at significant risk of
exhausting their other assets.

131. Van de Water, supra note 21, at 6.
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IV. WHAT WOULD A GOOD SECOND-TIER (EMPLOYER-SPONSORED)
SYSTEM LOOK LIKE?
Setting out the qualities of a good second-tier pension system
is not easy. There are legitimate disagreements about what these
qualities are. They naturally involve trade-offs and compromises,
and include choosing among various political and social goals. As
an example of the need to deal with trade-offs, achieving broad
coverage appears uncontroversial, except that it might require a
law compelling employers to offer a plan, and to enroll all or
nearly all of their employees in it. If opposition to such a mandate
remains strong, then an increase in coverage must be achieved
voluntarily.
There is legitimate disagreement over the means necessary to
achieve the desired ends, in part because the characteristics of a
good second tier will depend on the design of the first tier. As a
simple example of this interdependence, a first-tier public pension
with comparatively high replacement rates will mean that a
second-tier private pension system can place less emphasis on the
provision of an annuity. Another source of disagreement is a
difference in point of view. A case in point is achieving an
appropriate distribution of risk between employer and employee,
which is discussed further below. The employer’s idea of an
appropriate distribution of risk is bound to differ from that of its
employees.
Despite these disagreements, the success of pension reform is
normally assessed based on its impact on coverage and on the
adequacy of benefits. To these two basic criteria should be added
additional criteria for the appropriate assignment of risk between
the plan sponsor and plan participants, for portability, and for
minimizing complexity and maximizing transparency. The
achievement of these ancillary criteria will help increase the
chances that the retirement income of a particular household will
be adequate. For example, the appropriate assignment of risk will
reduce the likelihood that a stock market crash will decimate
wealth at retirement, and increased portability should increase
the share of accrued benefits that are actually paid. Moreover,
greater transparency and reduced complexity should help reduce
the risk of bad choices.
What follows describes more fully what each of these criteria
involves, and touches briefly on the trade-offs they entail. It is
important to note that there is an inevitable trade-off between
achieving a high score on coverage and adequacy on the one hand,
and flexibility or freedom of choice on the other. The more
voluntary a pension system is, the greater the chances that
retirement income security will be derailed by shortsighted or
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misinformed decisions by both employers and employees.132
A. Criteria for a Good Second-Tier Pension System
1. Coverage
Broader coverage of an employer-sponsored pension system is
normally deemed to be better coverage. Any limitations on
coverage need to be justified on the grounds that eliminating them
would not be feasible or that full coverage would involve an
unwarranted intrusion into private employers’ decisions. For
example, a restriction on coverage to full-time workers might be
justified on the grounds that migrant or casual workers were
particularly difficult to cover. Given the desirability of broader
coverage, the disparities of coverage across ethnic groups or
income levels, for example,133 suggest that special efforts need to
be made to include those groups. Countries that have achieved full
or nearly full coverage have either required employers to offer a
plan to nearly all of their employees, e.g., Australia, or have
achieved it as a part of comprehensive wage negotiations, e.g., the
Netherlands.134 Countries like Canada, the United Kingdom, and
the United States that have relied on favorable tax treatment of
contributions to increase coverage have not yet come close to
achieving it. In Canada and the United Kingdom, pension
coverage has declined in recent years.135
It has proven difficult for a private pension system to have
broad coverage without being employer-based. Either the employer
sponsors a plan, or must act as a conduit for contributions to an
investment fund or a separate pension plan. An employer-based
system is likely to achieve greater coverage than a purely
voluntary system where individuals contribute to IRAs or their
equivalent. Voluntary saving in tax-favored retirement saving
schemes does not cover a large share of the working population in
the United States or in any other industrial country.136
Broad or universal coverage has been criticized as imposing a
“straitjacket,” because it limits the use of savings to the financing
of retirement, and it can be argued that younger workers can quite
rationally prefer to devote their savings to a down payment on a
house, or to financing an education. If this is true, there is an
argument for allowing withdrawals from defined contributions
132. See e.g., JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN & GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE,
THE COST OF “CHOICE” IN A VOLUNTARY PENSION SYSTEM, 48 (Mar. 22, 2013).
133. Supra Table. 1.
134. MACKENZIE, supra note 122, at 20-24
135. Id. at 2-3.
136. PABLO ANTOLIN, COVERAGE OF FUNDED PENSION PLANS 6 (OECD
Working Papers on Insurance and Private
Pensions, No. 19, 2008) available at http://www.oecd.org/finance/
privatepensions/41122606.pdf.
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plan in certain circumstances. Under current law, employers may
offer loans for certain purposes, but withdrawals are substantially
penalized.137 On the other hand, excessive flexibility can vitiate
the goal of pension reform.
2. Adequacy
Adequacy is hard to pin down. Basically, it refers to whether
pension income is adequately high, as indicated by the pension’s
replacement rate and whether it is sustained throughout
retirement. A simple defined contribution system with a lump-sum
benefit might be adequate in the sense that it provided the means
for an adequate retirement income, but inadequate if a failure to
convert part or all of the lump sum into an annuity results in a
failure to deal with longevity risk (the risk that an individual’s
unexpectedly long life exhausts resources). In addition, as the data
in Table 2 suggest, a replacement rate for low-income earners may
have to be higher than one for middle or high-income earners in
order to ensure a socially acceptable standard of living in
retirement.
3. Appropriate Assignment of Risk
Anyone saving for retirement confronts three principal risks:
(1) savings risk, the risk that saving rates may be too low to
finance an adequate retirement; (2) investment risk, the risk of illconsidered or unlucky investments; and (3) longevity risk, the risk
of outliving one’s retirement savings.138 These risks are evident for
the self-employed, who do not participate in an employersponsored pension, but they also arise for those covered by some
employer-sponsored pension plans.
137. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TOPIC 558 – ADDITIONAL TAX ON
EARLY DISTRIBUTIONS FROM RETIREMENT PLANS, OTHER THAN IRAS,
available at http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc558.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2013). I.R.C. § 72(t) generally imposes a 10% tax on distributions made before
an individual reaches age 59½, but there are numerous exceptions. Id. For
example, there are exceptions for distributions on account of disability or to
cover high medical expenses. Id.
138. These are by no means the only risks to retirement security, but they
are probably the most important that the design of a second tier pension
system has to consider. See, e.g., AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, MAKING YOUR
RETIREMENT INCOME LAST A LIFETIME (2010) available at http://
cdn.ameriprisecontent.com/cds/alwp/advisor/david.p.weidman/cdocumentsand-settingsandrewdesktopwebsite-downloadsmaking-your-retirementincome-last-a-lifetiime634532517160486099.pdf (suggesting that the top risks
for today’s retirees include: longevity, inflation, market volatility, withdrawal
rate, health care expenses, and unexpected events); see also Youngkyun Park,
Retirement Income Adequacy With Immediate and Longevity Annuities, EMP.
BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., Issue Brief No. 357, 2011 available at http://
www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_05-2011_No357_Annuities.pdf
(discussing strategies for managing three types of risk: investment income,
longevity, and long-term care).
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The extent of savings risk depends a good deal on the design
of the plan, and cannot really be shared with the plan sponsor,
unlike investment risk. A plan sponsor is normally better able to
deal with longevity risk than an individual can, because it is able
to contract with an insurance company for annuities at group
rates, or simply pool the longevity risk of individual retirees.139
However, the sponsors of traditional pension plans are still
exposed to the risk that unexpectedly low interest rates will push
up annuity premiums and to the risk that the life expectancy of
different age cohorts cannot be accurately predicted (i.e., aggregate
longevity risk). An individual is exposed to the same risks as a
defined benefit plan sponsor when she buys an annuity upon
retirement, because interest rates strongly influence annuity
prices. Opinions differ as to the extent to which investment and
longevity risks can or should be borne by plan participants, but at
the very least, these risks should be shared between sponsor and
participants in some meaningful way.
The employer point of view is that because of recent changes
to the rules governing the valuation of pension plan assets and the
corporate accounting treatment of plan finances, the investment
risks to which the traditional defined benefit plan is vulnerable
entail too much balance sheet volatility and may even entail a
threat to corporate solvency. In addition, the changes in funding
rules introduced by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 mean that
a funding shortfall has to be made up more quickly than before.140
Whatever the merits of this view, the shift from traditional defined
benefit plans to defined contribution plans has placed investment
risk entirely on the shoulders of American workers. It is
reasonable to ask if all employees are up to this burden. In
principle, even if the corporations that sponsor pension plans have
become more risk averse, a trade-off might exist between current
compensation and the risk borne by plan participants: plan
participants might be willing to trade some amount of current
139. See BOARD OF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS supra note
106, at 93 tbl. VA.4 (showing that, at present, a 65-year-old woman in the U.S.
has a 50% chance of living past age 86, while a 65-year-old man has a 50%
chance of living past age 84); see also Fred Reish, Just out of Reish: Living
“Room”? The problem with living too long, PLAN SPONSOR, Aug. 2011,
available
at
http://www.plansponsor.com/
MagazineArticle.aspx?id=6442481375 (noting that the joint life expectancy of
a 65-year-old couple is even more remarkable: There is a 50% chance that at
least one 65-year-old spouse will live to age 91, and there is a 25% chance that
at least one will live to 95).
140. I.R.C. §§ 412, 430 (2006); but see The Moving Ahead for Progress in the
21st Century Act (MAP-21), Pub. L. No. 112-41, § 40211, 126 Stat. 405, 846,
(relaxing the funding requirements somewhat by allowing pension plans to
use higher interest rates to value their liabilities (and so reduce their
minimum required contributions)).
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compensation for greater certainty about their pensions.
However, investment risk may be shared between plan
sponsors and plan participants, more retired Americans will be
exposed to longevity risk. Dealing with these risks is not easy. The
Social Security annuity (i.e., inflation-adjusted benefits for life)
may provide enough longevity insurance for many Americans, but
not for all.
4. Portability
Pension rights should not be compromised by labor mobility,
and vesting periods should be minimized. Given the short tenures
and high mobility that characterize the American labor market,
portability must be an essential feature of an employer-sponsored
pension.141 Portability is a particular strength of the 401(k) plan.
Its vesting period is often no more than one year. A partial
substitute for portability would be pension preservation where
pension rights of vested but separated workers would be preserved
in real terms. This is a feature of some European second tiers.142
5. Complexity and Transparency
That a pension plan’s design is complex should not be taken
to imply that it lacks transparency. A pension plan may be
complex but nevertheless be transparent as long as its design is
not unduly complex, given the risks it is to cover, and its
conditions for eligibility of benefits, and benefit determination, are
explained as clearly as possible. Any institution established to
promote or achieve sound finances in retirement will be complex.
Nonetheless, the less complicated it is, the better.
One complicating feature of any assessment of complexity is
that plan sponsors and plan employees will not judge it in the
same way. For example, a traditional pension may be less complex
from the plan participant’s point of view because it involves fewer
decisions, but more complex for the sponsor. In a way, complexity
is shared between plan sponsor and participant, just like risk. A
401(k) plan without automatic annuitization or restrictions on
investments shifts complexity from plan sponsor to plan
participants. Whatever plan participants’ appetite for risk, it is
reasonable to ask whether they are up to dealing with the kind of
141. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, PROPOSALS AND ISSUES RELATING TO
THE PORTABILITY OF PENSION PLAN BENEFITS SCHEDULED FOR A HEARING
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND
MEANS ON JULY 12, 1988 4 (1988) available at https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3253.
142. MACKENZIE, supra note 122, at 29-31; OECD, OECD PRINCIPLES OF
OCCUPATIONAL PENSION REGULATION 66-68 (2010); John Turner, Pension
Portability-Is this Europe’s Future? An Analysis of the United States as a Test
Case, AARP PUB. POL. INST., Mar. 2003, at 2 available at http://
assets.aarp.org/rgcente r/econ/2003_03_pension.pdf.
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complexity entailed by a system where virtually every important
decision must be made by them.
Pertinent here, even choosing a retirement plan is a daunting
prospect. For example, a private employer who wants to establish
a retirement plan can choose from a wide variety of traditional
defined benefit plans, cash balance plans, money purchase pension
plans, target benefit plans, profit-sharing plans, stock bonus plans,
ESOPs, SIMPLE plans, and SEPs.143 Every one of these plans has
a different set of rules and regulations, limits on contributions,
vesting rules, and tax advantages. Because of the bewildering
complexity that has resulted, many analysts have called for
simplification,144 and some have even argued for creating one
single consistent pension system with one set of rules, limits, and
regulations.145 In fact, President George W. Bush’s budget
proposals for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 called for: (1)
consolidating traditional and Roth IRAs into Retirement Savings
Accounts (RSAs); and (2) consolidating the various types of
employer-sponsored defined contribution plans into new Employer
Retirement Savings Accounts (ERSAs).146 So far, simplification
proposals such as these have not had any traction.
B. Sketch of a Good System
Any sensible or practical reform has to work with the
institutions it finds; there is little point in trying to design a
pension system from scratch. As Woodrow Wilson, speaking of
economic reform, stated in his first inaugural address, “[w]e shall
deal with our economic system as it is and as it may be modified,
not as it might be if we had a clean sheet of paper to write
upon.”147 However desirable the traditional defined benefit pension
plan may be, it is at this point only wishful thinking to believe
that its decline in the private sector can be substantially

143. In the public sector, in addition to a variety of traditional I.R.C. §
401(a) plans, we also see a variety of I.R.C. § 403(b) and I.R.C. § 457
arrangements.
144. David A. Pratt, Focus on . . . Pension Simplification, 9(2) J. OF PENSION
BENEFITS 8, 9 (Winter 2002); PAMELA PERUN & C. EUGENE STEUERLE,
REALITY TESTING FOR PENSION REFORM 6 (The Urban Inst. Wash. D.C., 2003)
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
410797_reality_testing_pension_reform.pdf.
145. Robert L. Brown, Pension Simplification: The Factor of 11 and U.S.
Pension Reform, CONTINGENCIES, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 48 available at http://
www.contingencies.org/sepoct05/Workshop_0905.pdf.
146. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 35, at 59-61; Patrick J.
Purcell, Retirement Savings Accounts: President’s Budget Proposal for FY2005,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Feb. 6, 2004, at 5 available at http://
digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=key_workplace.
147. President Woodrow Wilson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1913).
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reversed.148
At the outset, we consider the two basic approaches for
enhancing retirement security: (1) expanding the current Social
Security system; and (2) strengthening the private pension
system. We then discuss our recommendations about how to
enhance retirement income security by building on the current
401(k) system.
1. Expand the Social Security System
One way to enhance the retirement security of American
workers would be to increase Social Security benefits. For
example, one could imagine tweaking the benefit formula so that
the Social Security system replaced 80% of pre-retirement
earnings, at least for workers with low lifetime earnings. As Social
Security already replaces around 70% of the pre-retirement
earnings for those workers in the lowest quintile of lifetime
household earnings,149 increasing replacement rates for those
households to 80% would not cost that much. The cost would be
even lower if Congress targeted the benefit increases to those with
the lowest lifetime earnings, rather than increasing Social
Security benefits for all retirees. A recent survey found that 75% of
Americans believe that the United States should consider
increasing Social Security benefits to provide a more secure
retirement for working Americans.150 By increasing the generosity
of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, Congress could
also ensure that all retirees escape poverty, regardless of how low
their lifetime earnings might be.
To be sure, raising revenue to pay for more Social Security
benefits would be a challenge, especially given the current political
climate and the feeling of many that current retirees will fare
significantly better than younger cohorts. Historically, in order to
raise money for more Social Security benefits, the federal
government has raised the Social Security payroll tax—at least 20
times since the program began in 1937.151 While the government
could, perhaps, raise payroll taxes again, if additional revenue is
needed to enhance retirement income security for low-income

148. ZELINSKY, supra note 86.
149. Supra Figure 2.
150. JASMINE V. TUCKER, VIRGINIA P. RENO & THOMAS N. BETHELL,
STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT DO AMERICANS WANT? 10 (2013)
available
at
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/
What_Do_Americans_Want.pdf; see Duncan Black, 401Ks are a disaster, USA
TODAY, Feb. 5, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/02/05/socialsecurity-retirement-benefits-column/1891155. (recommending an across the
board 20% increase in Social Security benefits).
151. FORMAN, supra note 3, at 199; Tax Policy Center, Historical Social
Security Tax Rates (Feb. 26, 2013) available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
taxfacts/content/pdf/ssrate_historical.pdf.
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workers, it might be fairer to raise those revenues from our
progressive income tax system. In any event, simply raising the
payroll tax rate would not adequately target the benefit increases
to workers with low lifetime earnings. For example, because the
current Social Security system has generous spousal and
dependent benefits, benefit increases tends to favor married
couples over single individuals, one-earner couples over two-earner
couples, and larger families over smaller families.152 In short,
while Congress could raise payroll taxes and increase Social
Security benefits, that approach might not be the most efficient
way to enhance the retirement incomes of workers, least of all
those with low lifetime earnings. A more comprehensive reform
may be needed.
2. Strengthening the Private Pension System
Another approach for increasing retirement incomes would be
to enhance the second-tier private pension system. With the near
disappearance of traditional defined benefit plans, expanding the
private pension system probably means encouraging or mandating
individual retirement accounts on top of the current Social
Security system. These accounts could be held by the Social
Security Administration, invested in a broadly diversified portfolio
of stocks, bonds, and government notes, and annuitized on
retirement. Alternatively, these accounts could be held and
invested by private pension funds, as is the case Australia and
Chile.153
In 1981, the President’s Commission on Pension Policy
recommended adoption of a Minimum Universal Pension System
that would have required all employers to contribute at least 3% of
wages to private pensions for their workers.154 That proposal
attracted little interest at the time, but there has recently been
renewed interest in such mandatory pensions.155 One study
152. FORMAN, supra note 3, at 193-195.
153. David C. John & Ruth Levine, National Retirement Savings Systems in
Australia, Chile, New Zealand and the United Kingdom: Lessons for the
United States, BROOKINGS, July 2009, at 1 available at http://
www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/07_retirement_savings_john.aspx;
AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE, APRA-REGULATED FUNDS – HOME, http://
www.ato.go v.au/superfunds/pathway.aspx?sid=42&pc=001/149/031&mfp=001/
149&mnu=52002#001_149_031 (last visited Feb. 20, 2013); Barbara E.
Kritzer, Chile’s Next Generation Pension Reform, 68(2) SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 69,
73
(2008)
available
at
http://199.173.225.108/policy/docs/ssb/v68n2/
v68n2p69.pdf.
154. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE:
TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY (1981).
155. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-193SP, SOCIAL
SECURITY REFORM: ANSWERS TO KEY QUESTIONS 56 (2005) available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05193sp.pdf; see generally Jonathan Barry
Forman, Should We Replace the Current Pension System with a Universal
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estimates that 3% add-on individual accounts could provide an
annual retirement benefit equal to 14.5% of final wages for men,
13.3% of final wages for women, 14.5% of final wages for oneearner couples, and 13.9% of final wages for two earner couples in
the long run.156
Shy of mandating individual accounts, the government may
want to require that every employer have a pension plan or at
least offer their employees a 401(k) plan or a payroll-deduction
IRA coupled with automatic enrollment features.157 Studies have
shown that automatically enrolling people into 401(k) plans can
achieve higher levels of participation, and automatically escalating
the levels of their contributions can dramatically increase their
levels of savings.158 A recent survey found that most Americans
would like to see a universal, privately-run, individual-account
pension system with auto-enrollment features, portability from job
to job, and the opportunity for monthly checks throughout
retirement.159
C. Our Model Second-Tier Pension System
The model second-tier pension system that this paper
proposes is based on an enhanced form of the 401(k) plan that
conserves that plan’s most valuable features while reforming or
mitigating the effects of its less desirable ones.
Pension System?, 16(2) J. OF PENSION BENEFITS 48, 49 (2009); see generally
TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST PENSIONS
AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 200-292 (2008).
156. ADAM L. CARASSO & JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, TAX CONSIDERATIONS
IN A UNIVERSAL PENSION SYSTEM 12 (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center,
Discussion Paper No. 28, 2007) available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/411593_universal_pension_system.pdf.
157. Barbara Butricia & Richard W. Johnson, How Much Might Automatic
IRAs Improve Retirement Security for Low- and Moderate-Wage Workers?,
URBAN INSTITUTE, Brief No. 33, July 2011, at 2 available at http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412360-Automatic-IRAs-Improve-RetirementSecurity.pdf; OECD, OECD PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2012 45-76 (2012) available at
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-pensions-outlook2012_9789264169401-en; James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C.
Madrian, $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans,
93(3) REV. OF ECON. AND STATISTICS 748, 750 (2011).
158. OECD, supra note 157, at 45-76; Richard H. Thaler & Schlomo
Bernartzi, The Behavioral Economics of Retirement Savings Behavior (AARP
PUB. POLICY INST., Research Report No. 2007-02, 2007) available at http://
assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/2007_02_savings.pdf;
Jack
VanDerhei,
Increasing Default Deferral Rates in Automatic Enrollment 401(k) Plans: The
Impact on Retirement Savings Success in Plans with Automatic Escalation,
33(9) EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. NOTES 12, 13 (2012).
159. DIANE OAKLEY & KELLY KENNEALLY, PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT
SECURITY 2013: A ROADMAP FOR POLICY MAKERS 13 (National Institute on
Retirement Security, 2013) available at http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/
documents/2013%20Opinion%20Study/
final_2013restricted_opinion_research.pdf.
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1. Coverage
A mandate on employers to offer a pension plan to most of
their employees is probably the only way for the United States to
join those countries with near-universal coverage of their
workforces.160 Australia has achieved its coverage rate of 90% with
a mandate on employers to offer to enroll their employees in a
fund—there is no obligation on employers to sponsor their own
plan.161 A mandate is not, however, politically feasible at present
in the United States. Broader coverage can be achieved without an
employer mandate by requiring that employers that do offer a plan
make participation in it the default. Of course, even this watereddown requirement may deter some employers from sponsoring
their own plan if the plan attracts employees whose participation
is deemed to be costly.
The automatic IRA that has been proposed in the United
States would be a relatively painless way of extending coverage.162
The employees of employers who opt for the scheme would be
automatically enrolled in a retirement savings plan unless they
explicitly chose to opt out. Employers would simply act as a
conduit for their employees’ contributions. A small subsidy paid for
by the federal government would defray the extra costs to
employers of participating in the scheme.163 California is taking a
less voluntary approach: it recently enacted legislation that will
require employers above a certain size who do not sponsor a plan
of their own to provide their employees access to a fund to be
managed by the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CALPERs).164 Both the automatic IRA and the California Secure
160. To be sure, if universal coverage becomes the goal, the U.S. will
probably need to move towards a mandatory pension system, as tax incentives
and automatic enrollment are unlikely to lead to universal coverage. FORMAN,
supra note 3, at 242; Choi et al., supra note 157; OECD, supra note 2, at 45.
161. Jonathan Barry Forman, Optimal Distribution Rules for Defined
Contribution Plans: What Can the United States and Australia Learn from
Other Countries?, N.Y. UNIV. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS AND COMP. 3-1, 3-15
(2012).
162. Butrica, supra note 157, at 2.
163. Automatically reenrollment can also increase participation and
savings. Kristen Heinzinger, Guiding Hands: Reenrollment in QDIA helps
plan diversification, PLAN SPONSOR, Jan. 2013, at 15, available at http://
www.plansponsor.com/MagazineArticle.aspx?id=6442491160;
Vanguard
Strategic Retirement Consulting, Improving plan diversification through
reenrollment
in
a
QDIA
(Aug.
2012)
available
at
https://
institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/RENPPR.pdf; Judy Ward, Reinvigorating
Enrollment, PLAN SPONSOR, Sept. 2012, at 34, available at http://
www.plansponsor.com/MagazineArticle.aspx?id=6442488926.
164. The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2011 CA
S.B. 1234 (2012); ALETA SPRAGUE, THE CALIFORNIA SECURE CHOICE
RETIREMENT SAVINGS PROGRAM (New America Foundation, April 2013),
available
at
http://assets.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/CAretireme

Do Not Delete

670

10/18/2013 4:26 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:631

Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act are designed to benefit the
employees of small employers, whose participation rates in
employer-sponsored plans have always been low.165
Reform may also need to address a feature of the American
system that sets it apart from those of all other industrialized
nations: coverage and nondiscrimination rules.166 These rules are
intended to ensure that coverage and the generosity of employer
plans do not discriminate unduly against their lower-paid
employees and in favor of their higher paid employees. However,
these rules can be burdensome for small employers, and there is
little evidence that they have led to increased benefits for nonhighly compensated workers.167 As long as employers above a
certain size are not required to offer a plan to all their employees,
these nondiscrimination rules, or a modified version of these rules,
will have to remain in place. It might be possible to increase
coverage by making the targets more ambitious, although such a
step might lead to a decline in the number of plans offered.
2. Sharing of Risk
a. Savings Risk
Traditional pension plans and cash balance plans reduce the
risk of under-saving by setting fixed contribution (or deemed
contribution) rates, assuming these rates are set adequately high.
The 401(k) plan does not do that. If a minimum contribution rate
ntFinal4.26.13.pdf; Michael Hiltzik, A Crucial Step Toward Retirement
Security for the Working Class, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, available at http://
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20130219,0,1359955.column;
Laura
Mahoney, California Governor Signs Bills to Create Pension Mandate for
Private Employers, 190 BNA DAILY TAX REPORT H-2, H-3 (2012); ROSS
EISENBREY & MONIQUE MORRISSEY, CALIFORNIA RETIREMENT PLAN COULD
SERVE AS A NATIONAL MODEL (Economic Policy Institute, Sep. 13, 2012)
available at http://www.epi.org/publication/pm193-california-retirement-plannational-model; Duane Thompson, Solving a Retirement Crisis: It’s as Simple
as 123(4), FI360 BLOG (Dec. 12, 2012) available at http://blog.fi360.com/
fi360_blog/2012/12/solving-a-retirement-crisis-its-as-simple-as-1234.html;
National CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE SPONSORED
RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLANS FOR NON-PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, available at http://
www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-sponsored-retirement-plans-fornonpublic.aspx. (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
165. Supra Table 1.
166. I.R.C. § 410(b) (2006); I.R.C. § 410 (a)(4) (2006).
167. Nondiscrimination Rules and Declining Pension Participation: Cause
and Effect?, WATSON WYATT INSIDER, May 2001 available at http://
www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/showarticle.asp?ArticleID=8277; Eric
Toder & Karen E. Smith, Do Low-income Workers Benefit from 401(k) Plans?,
(Boston College Center for Retirement Research, Working Paper No. 2011-14,
2011) available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/wp_201114_508-1.pdf; see generally Peter J. Brady, Pension Nondiscrimination Rules
and the Incentive to Cross Subsidize Employees, 6(2) J. OF PENSION ECON. AND
FINANCE 127 (2007).
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is not feasible politically, then it might be possible to boost savings
in 401(k) plans by having employer matching contributions apply
only once employee contributions reach a certain level, which
would create a threshold or a notch effect. The idea behind this
proposal is that plan participants could be expected to save some
minimum amount, like 3% of salary. The match could be greater
than 100%, but it would not apply until employee contributions
exceeded that stipulated threshold. Another possibility would be to
promote the adoption of schemes like “Save More Tomorrow,”
where the employee commits to saving a specified part of any
future salary increase.168 Both schemes are entirely voluntary.
A third approach would be to replace the current system of
tax deductions, which favors those with higher incomes, with a
system of refundable tax credits. A tax credit system could be
designed so that Americans with low incomes, who at present do
not earn enough money to pay tax, or to pay tax at a rate high
enough to make exclusions or deductions attractive, would receive
a tax credit instead. A tax credit would better target incentives for
contributing to IRAs and 401(k) plans, because it would favor lowincome taxpayers with low participation rates.169 The premise
underlying this approach is that the reduction in tax relief for
higher income households would not significantly reduce their
saving.
b. Investment Risk
Investment risk has two components. The first, which applies
when plan investments are self-directed, is the risk of ill-advised,
rash, or excessively conservative investments. In principle, that
risk can be addressed by pooling accounts for investment purposes
and delegating the investment function to competent and honest
professionals, although the possibility that a plan’s investments as
whole may be ill-advised should not be ruled out. A concerted
effort to provide financial education might also help. The second
could be called timing risk or simply bad luck, which means that
the risk that the rate of return on a plan’s investment is well
below some norm for some time.170

168. Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using
Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112(S1) J. OF POL. ECON.
S164, S164 (2004).
169. WILLIAM G. GALE, DAVID C. JOHN & SPENCER SMITH, NEW WAYS TO
PROMOTE RETIREMENT SAVINGS (AARP Research Report, 2012) available at
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/
econ_sec/2012/new-ways-promote-retirement-saving-AARP-pp-econ-sec.pdf;
see generally WILLIAM G. GALE, TAX REFORM OPTIONS: PROMOTING
RETIREMENT SECURITY: HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE,
112th Cong. (2011), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Testimony%20of%20William%20Gale.pdf.
170. Timing risk also arises at the distribution stage. A rule to withdraw 4%
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It is possible to share investment risk between the plan
sponsor and plan participant, if a plan sponsor is unwilling or
unable to bear all of it. This sharing of risk can be done in many
ways. For example, one approach used in Switzerland is to set a
minimum rate of return on the balances of participants of defined
contribution or hybrid plans.171 Another approach, which would
reduce the average rate of return earned by plan participants,
would be to set both a floor and a ceiling. The combination would
serve a purpose similar to the “collar,” or a combination of buying
a put and selling a call that private investors use to mitigate
fluctuations in the value of their portfolios.172 Still another
approach would be to tie the rate of return on contributions to a
Treasury bond rate, as is often the practice of cash balance
plans.173 This practice will not eliminate risk, but it is likely to
dampen the swings in account balances that can occur with 401(k)
plans.
Investment risk can also be dampened by encouraging
participants to choose asset allocations of moderate risk and a
moderately high rate of return. For example, in recognition of the
historically poor investment choices made by individual plan
participants, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 amended ERISA
section 404(c) to improve the default investments that are
provided for workers who do not otherwise direct their own
investments.174 The new law encourages employers to replace their
low-yield, stable-value bond funds with balanced funds (funds with
an unchanging mix of stocks and bonds) and life-cycle funds

of the balance in a retirement saving plan could lead to excessively rapid
decumulation if the value of the plan plummets because of poorly performing
financial markets. Webb, supra note 27 (noting that a 4% withdrawal rule can
become a 6% or 8% withdrawal rule if stock markets collapse at the outset of
retirement); Finke et al., supra note 11.
171. MONIKA BÜTLER & MARTIN RUESCH, ANNUITIES IN SWITZERLAND 14-15
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS4438, 2007) available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/12/
12/000158349_20071212141747/Rendered/PDF/wps4438.pdf.
172. A put entitles its owner to sell a stock at a predetermined price.
Owning a put is a kind of insurance against a drop in price. Selling a call
places an upper bound on the stock’s price, because the owner of the call may
buy the stock at some predetermined price, and will elect to do so once the
actual price moves above the predetermined one.
173. Mark L. Lofgren, IRS Further Delays Interest Rules on Cash Balance
Accounts, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, Sep. 28, 2012 available at http://
ebn.benefitnews.com/news/irs-further-delays-interest-rules-cash-balanceaccounts-2728070-1.html.
174. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(5) (2006); ERISA § 404(c)(5) added by the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 § 624(a); Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola, Stephen P.
Utkus & Taxkeshi Yamaguchi, The Dynamics of Lifecycle Investing in 401(k)
Plans 1 (Population Aging Research Center, PARC Working Paper No. 19,
University of Pennsylvania, 2008) available at http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=parc_working_papers.
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(funds, which gradually shift their investments from stocks
towards bonds as workers age).175
Another possibility is risk-sharing across generations, which
has been proposed by Senator Tom Harkin, the Chair of the U.S.
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.176
For example, a sustained period of poor financial market
performance would result in reductions in the benefit paid to those
plan participants who had already retired so that benefits to
prospective retirees could be higher than they otherwise would be.
When investments are self-directed, setting a minimum rate
of return on a plan participant’s portfolio creates a potential
problem of moral hazard if the floor on the rate of return applies
regardless of how aggressive the portfolio stance is. This problem
can be addressed by having separate minimum rates of return for
the equity and the fixed interest components of a participant’s
portfolio. This expedient would reduce the incentive to shift from
bonds to stocks, but not the incentive to increase the share of
growth or speculative stocks in the equity sub-portfolio. However,
there may be practical problems with implementing this approach.
A key issue is whether all employers would be willing to bear
part of a plan’s investment risk in this way, and if they were not
willing, what might be done about it. A rule requiring a minimum
rate of return could make employers less willing to offer plans or,
at least, reduce the range of mutual funds and other investments
offered. Depending on its level, a guarantee of a minimum rate of
return might never be triggered if plan participants’ investment
portfolios were sufficiently conservative.
c.

Longevity Risk

As already noted, some Americans may have an adequate
share of their wealth at retirement in the form of an annuity.

175. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2006); More specifically, the final regulation
provides for four types of so-called “qualified default investment alternatives”
(QDIAs). U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security
Administration, Regulation Relating to Qualified Default Investment
Alternatives in Participant-Directed Individual Account Plans (Fact Sheet,
April 2008) available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsQDIA.pdf; Joseph
Masterson, Target Date Funds: Ready, Fire, Aim, 19(1) J. OF PENSION
BENEFITS 3, 4 (2011).
176. Chairman Tom Harken, The Retirement Crisis and a Plan to Solve It
(U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, July 2012)
available at http://www.harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/5011b69191eb4.pdf
(proposing Universal, Secure, and Adaptable [“USA”] Retirement Funds);
Hazel Bradford, Harkin’s retirement plan proposal is a hit, PENSIONS & INV.,
Aug. 6, 2012, available at http://www.pionline.com/article/20120806/
PRINTSUB/308069981# (proposing a new position on the matter); but see
Editorial, No need for new DC Plan, PENSIONS & INV., Nov. 26, 2012 available
at http://www.pionline.com/article/20121126/PRINTSUB/311269995 (taking
the position that a new plan is unnecessary).
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However, the decline of the traditional pension and the growing
dominance of the 401(k) plan, whose balances are normally not
annuitized at retirement, have increased longevity risk for middleincome earners. Although an increasing number of 401(k) plans
now have an in-plan option for a life annuity, such options remain
comparatively rare.177 As the balances in 401(k) plans grow, more
and more middle-income Americans will retire with substantial
liquid assets that they would not have had if they had been
participants in defined benefit plans. Using just a part of these
assets to buy a life annuity would not leave them dangerously
illiquid. According to one recent study, 89% of plan participants
would like their plans to provide them lifetime income options, and
85% like the idea of a fund that automatically converts savings
into a guaranteed income stream at retirement.178
For those older Americans who need or want more
annuitization of their wealth than delaying receipt of their Social
Security benefits can provide,179 there are ways to encourage more
plan sponsors to offer annuities, and to encourage more plan
participants to elect annuity payouts. One approach would be for
the government to require retirees to purchase annuities or
similar lifetime income guarantees.180 Alternatively, the
government might just want to take steps to encourage
annuitization. For example, the government could require plan
sponsors to make annuity options available to plan participants as
they near retirement.181 The government might even want to
177. Supra note 50.
178. INSURED RETIREMENT INSTITUTE, GUARANTEED LIFETIME INCOME
OPTIONS WITHIN EMPLOYMENT-BASED PLANS 2, 5 (2013) available at https://
avectra.myirionline.org/eweb/uploads/
Guaranteed%20Lifetime%20Income%20Options%20within%20EmploymentBased%20Plans.pdf; BLACK ROCK, ANNUAL RETIREMENT SURVEY: WHAT
RETIREES HAVE TO TELL US ABOUT THE NEW WORLD OF RETIREMENT 5 (2012)
available
at
https://www2.blackrock.com/webcore/litService/search/
getDocument.seam?venue=FP_GENERIC&ServiceName=PublicServiceView&
ContentID=1111170786.
179. The higher a person’s working income, the less would be the
replacement rate that even delaying the Social Security benefit would make
possible.
180. MACKENZIE, supra note 86, at 191-200; Jeffrey R. Brown, Automatic
Lifetime Income as a Path to Retirement Income Security (American Council of
Life Insurers, White Paper, September 2009) available at http://
www.wiserwomen.org/pdf_files/
Brown,%20Retirement%20Income%20Security.pdf; Pamela Perun, Retirement
Savings: Confronting the Challenge of Longevity (The Aspen Institute
Initiative
on
Financial
Security,
2010)
available
at
http://
www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/
ConfrontingLongevity_AspenIFS.pdf; FORMAN, supra note 3, at 238-239.
181. U.S.
GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
GAO-11-400,
RETIREMENT INCOME: ENSURING INCOME THROUGHOUT RETIREMENT
REQUIRES DIFFICULT CHOICES 38-39 (2011); JEFFREY R. BROWN,
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF ANNUITIES IN RETIREMENT PLANNING 178, 199-

Do Not Delete

2013]

10/18/2013 4:26 PM

Reforming the Second Tier of the U.S. Pension System

675

require plans to default participants into annuities or trial
annuities, unless plan participants affirmatively elect otherwise.182
Given the concerns of many employers over plan-related litigation,
it might be necessary to enact a safe harbor provision so that plan
sponsors observing due diligence in selecting an annuity provider
would not be exposed to liability. Larger plans might want to offer
their own annuities, or arrange for group annuity rates through a
broker. Larger plans could also be required to provide information
on annuities.
Even when a participant of a defined contribution plan is
offered an annuity and is able to make a knowledgeable decision
about the share of her wealth at retirement to be annuitized, the
issues of interest rate risk and aggregate longevity risk will arise.
Low interest rates at the time when an annuity is purchased mean
high premiums, as do increases in life expectancies and increased
uncertainty over the average life expectancies of particular age
cohorts. Staggering the purchase of annuities as retirement
approaches is not an effective way of dealing with interest rate
risk. One possible solution is the in-service annuity, where
contributions to a 401(k) plan buy small deferred annuities that
will only begin paying at retirement.183 This means that the
income that will be generated at retirement will reflect interest
rates over a long period; this reduces the risk entailed by buying
one or perhaps a few annuities at or during the run-up to
retirement.
Various solutions are available to deal with aggregate
longevity risk, which cannot be disposed of merely by increasing
the size of the pool of annuitants. A fledging market already exists
in Europe for longevity bonds whose coupon payment increases
when the longevity of a targeted population exceeds a certain
benchmark.184 These instruments can be acquired by any
200 (Annamaria Lusardi, ed., 2008).
182. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 181, at 39-40;
MACKENZIE, supra note 86, at 200-203; see J. Mark Iwry & John A. Turner,
Automatic Annuitization: New Behavioral Strategies for Expanding Lifetime
Income (Retirement Security Project, Paper No. 2009-2, 2009) available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/
07_annuitization_iwry/07_annuitization_iwry.pdf (discussing various default
strategies); see WILLIAM G. GALE, J. MARK IWRY, DAVID C. JOHN & LINA
WALKER, INCREASING ANNUITIZATION IN 401(K) PLANS WITH AUTOMATIC
TRIAL INCOME 16 (Retirement Security Project, Paper No. 2008-2, 2008)
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/
06_annuities_gale/06_annuities_gale.pdf (recommending defaulting retirees
into receiving at least 24 consecutive monthly payments from an annuity or
similar lifetime income product).
183. Brown, supra note 180; MACKENZIE, supra note 86, at 195-200.
184. DAVID BLAKE, TOM BOARDMAN & ANDREW CAIRNS, SHARING
LONGEVITY RISK: WHY GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ISSUE LONGEVITY BONDS 5
(The Pensions Institute, Discussion Paper No. PI-1002, 2012) available at
http://pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1002.pdf; DAVID BLAKE, TOM
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institution confronting longevity risks. A market in derivatives
whose values respond in the same way has also emerged.
Aggregate longevity risk can also be shared between plan sponsors
and plan participants, or it can be borne entirely by the
participants.
Government and plan sponsors should probably also do more
to encourage workers to stay “on the job” longer. In that regard,
Table 4 shows estimates of how average annuity income can
increase from working longer.185 For example, working just one
more year can increase annual income 9% overall and by as much
as 16% for low-income workers. The savings available to buy an
annuity increase, and its premium declines.
TABLE 4. INCREASE IN AVERAGE ANNUITY INCOME FROM
WORKING LONGER (PERCENT)
Lifetime Earnings
Increase from
Increase from Working
Quintile
Working One
Five More Years
More Year
Bottom
16
98
Second
12
71
Middle
10
61
Fourth
8
52
Top
7
42
All
9
56

Source: BARBARA BUTRICA, KAREN E. SMITH & C. EUGENE STEUERLE,
WORKING FOR A GOOD RETIREMENT 28 fig. 2 (Urban Institute, Retirement
Project Discussion Paper No. 06-03, 2006) available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/311333_good_retirement.pdf.

d. Complexity/Transparency
When complexity is assessed separately from the plan
sponsor’s as well as the employee’s point of view, the trade-off
between the two becomes apparent. From the plan sponsor’s point
of view, the 401(k) plan is less complex than the traditional
pension, because the 401(k) plan effectively leaves the choice of
contribution rate, the investment function, and the management of
BOARDMAN & ANDREW CAIRNS, THE CASE FOR LONGEVITY BONDS 2 (Boston
College Center for Retirement Research, Issue in Brief 10-10, 2010) available
at
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/IB_10-10-508.pdf;
PABLO
ANTOLIN & HANS BLOMMESTEIN, GOVERNMENTS AND THE MARKET FOR
LONGEVITY-INDEXED BONDS 7 (OECD Working Papers on Insurance and
Private Pensions No. 4, 2007) available at http://www.oecd.org/insurance/
insurance/37977290.pdf; see generally JEFFREY R. BROWN & PETER R. ORSZAG,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOVERNMENT ISSUED LONGEVITY BONDS (2006)
available at http://www.investmentnews.com/assets/docs/CI15770330.PDF.
185. BARBARA BUTRICA, KAREN E. SMITH & C. EUGENE STEUERLE,
WORKING FOR A GOOD RETIREMENT 28 fig. 2 (Urban Institute, Retirement
Project Discussion Paper No. 06-03, 2006) available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/311333_good_retirement.pdf.
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the distribution phase to the plan participant. This difference in
complexity is reflected in the available estimates of the relative
cost of administering the two plans; the traditional pension is
more costly to administer than the 401(k) plan.186
Standard analyses of the defined contribution and defined
benefit plan divide have addressed the issue of the allocation of
risk between sponsor and participant. However, as noted, a plan’s
complexity can also be distributed in different ways between
sponsor and participant. Whatever the ability of participants to
bear investment or longevity risk, a 401(k) plan effectively places
more of the administrative burden entailed by the investment and
distribution functions on plan participants. Plan participants
become responsible for educating themselves about investing, and
for making choices among competing investments. Similarly, they
must decide on the form of distribution they would prefer.
If the defined benefit plan cannot be resurrected, perhaps
steps could be taken to lighten the burden of complexity placed on
defined contribution plan participants. One such step would be to
have more effective financial education, which would probably
have to be provided by the plan sponsors themselves. Another
possibility would be to place greater reliance on default settings
for investment choices. For example, automatically defaulting plan
participants into target date funds could help overcome the inertia
that prevents many of those participants from reducing their
investments in stocks and other risky assets as they age.187 Yet
another step would be to promote defined contribution plan funds
where investment decisions are made by the plan sponsor.

186. It generally costs more to administer defined benefit plans than defined
contribution plans, for example, because of the need to hire actuaries and pay
guaranteed annuities. Hazel Bateman & Olivia S. Mitchell, New Evidence on
Pension Plan Design and Administrative Expenses: The Australian Experience,
3(1) J. OF PENSION ECON. AND FINANCE 63, 68 (2004); Sean Collins, The
Expenses of Defined Benefit Plans and Mutual Funds, 9(6) INV. CO. INST.
PERSP. (2003) available at http://www.iciglobal.org/pdf/per09-06.pdf. For
example, one study found that, in 1996, the costs for administering defined
benefit plans ranged from 3.10% of pay for the smallest plan in the study to
0.23% of pay for the largest plan, while costs for defined contribution plans
ranged from 1.44% of pay for the smallest plan to 0.16% of pay for the largest
plan. Edwin C. Hustead, TRENDS IN RETIREMENT INCOME PLAN
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES, IN LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
PENSIONS: REMAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR RETIREMENT 166, 170 (Olivia S.
Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber, eds., 1998).
187. A target date fund is a fund where the exposure to be risky assets is
automatically a gradually reduced over time. Thus, a fund aimed at 35 yearold investors might have an asset allocation of 85% in stocks and 15% in
bonds. It could be designed to reduce the share of stocks and increase that
bond investment by 1.5% each year, so that by the time the investor reaches
65, the share of stocks will fall to 40%, and the share of bonds will rise to 60%.
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V. CONCLUSION
Reform of the second tier of the American retirement system
should be a priority. Yet, given both the political and economic
environment, reform is likely to be piecemeal, and only partially
successful in its aims. The approach of public policy to enhancing
retirement security in the United States has to be opportunistic.
There is no grand scheme, however well designed, that could
become law in the current environment. There are ways in which
both coverage and retirement saving can be increased, and there
are ways to increase the popularity of annuities and other lifetime
income products, but the gains on these fronts will be incremental.
Coverage can be increased, but universal or near-universal
coverage is not a realistic aim at the moment. The issue is not one
of technical feasibility, as demonstrated by the success of
Australia’s nearly universal pension system. Most American
employees work for employers with 100 or more employees, and
the administrative burden of enrolling employees in a plan can be
reduced by making the employer a conduit for contributions to a
retirement savings plan of some kind, just as the employer now is
for Social Security. The automatic IRA proposal depends on
making the employer’s role as a conduit as painless as possible.
Even if near universal coverage cannot be achieved, the
combination of an automatic IRA program and the right default
settings could increase the rate of coverage substantially.
Coverage is one thing; an adequate saving rate is another.
The flexibility of 401(k) plans and IRAs is both a strength and a
weakness. In principle, the law could be amended to stipulate a
minimum contribution rate. The simplest form this could take
would be a fixed rate up to some threshold salary level, but there
are many other possibilities.188 The difficulty that arises with this
approach is that it could simultaneously encourage saving by some
but discourage it by others. If there is no requirement to
participate in a plan, as is currently the case, some employees will
simply opt out. This undesirable response is a good illustration of
what happens when the scope of policy is limited: make a pension
plan more costly or expensive without requiring that it be offered,
and the result may be fewer pension plans or plans with more
restrictions.
More generally, any increase in the regulation of pension
plans for social purposes while plan sponsors are free to terminate
their plans can backfire. Other, less direct, methods of
encouraging saving, like shifting to a tax credit system, might
increase saving among lower- paid workers by more than it
188. See supra note 80 (explaining that a less demanding approach might
involve toughening the nondiscrimination rules, for example, by raising the
safe harbor required contribution rate from 3% or 5% and by raising the safe
harbor matching contribution rates).
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reduces it among the highly–paid workers. The further growth of
cash balance plans, where participation is a condition of
employment, would achieve the same end because their
contribution rate is fixed. Whether public policy can stimulate the
growth of these plans is uncertain.
More and more 401(k) plans are offering what has come to be
known as a lifetime income solution—that is, some type of
annuity, or a guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit. A measure
like a trial annuity, which is intended to defeat the inhibitions
that most people display toward annuities, could help increase the
take-up of annuities and similar products. As mentioned, the
Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. Department of Labor’s
Employee Benefits Security Administration recently requested
comments about annuitization and other lifetime income
options.189 There was a large response, not simply from financial
institutions, academics or interested nonprofits like AARP, but
also from individuals.190 The overwhelming message of the last
group was that the government should keep its hands off of 401(k)
plans and not make them offer annuities or other lifetime income
products. The financial industry was more restrained and
measured in its comments, but its position was much the same:
the financial industry would prefer if the markets for lifetime
income products developed in response to changes in the demand
for lifetime income products, and not as the result of a government
fiat. As this article goes to press, no laws have been enacted, and
no regulations have been promulgated to mandate lifetime income
products, although the Treasury has proposed regulations that
would encourage annuitization.191 Financial institutions have
introduced a variety of new products that could help boost
annuitization, and notably what has come to be known as
longevity insurance.192 So far, the response from employees and
employers has been tepid, but that may change.
These proposals and suggestions may strike the reader as
limited, and they are limited. Nonetheless, and even in the
absence of a mandate for sweeping reform, they could help
broaden coverage, increase saving, and help ensure that
retirement savings will generate a lifetime of retirement income.

189. Supra note 125.
190. U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration,
Lifetime Income Options For Participants And Beneficiaries In Retirement
Plans, available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-1210-AB33.html (last
viewed Feb. 27, 2013).
191. TREASURY FACT SHEET, supra note 126.
192. FORMAN, supra note 161, at 3-21—3-31.
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